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PICKETING-FREE SPEECH: THE GROWTH OF THE
NEW LAW OF PICKETING FROM 1940 TO 1952
Joseph Tanenhaus*
On April 22, 1940, the Supreme Court of the United States in Thornhill v. Alabama, invalidated a state law prohibiting all picketing.1
Industrial controversies, wrote Mr. Justice Murphy for the Court,
are "matters of public concern," and picketing the only "practicable
method whereby the facts of a labor dispute may be publicized in the
vicinity of the place of business of the employer."' Alabama's statute,
he continued, since it forbids even picketing peaceably engaged in for
the purpose of dissuading persons from dealing with a disputed firm,
unconstitutionally restricts freedom of speech.
In one bold move the Court stripped away the fifty-year-old underpinnings of the law of picketing.3 From 1880 to 1940, that law had
rested on a foundation of tort principles. As an intentional act which
damaged "property" rights, picketing, unless legally privileged, was
actionable at law and enjoinable in equity. The burden of proving
justification rested with the pickets, who, in order to establish the lawfulness of their activity, were required to show self-interest. Well-defined
rules, both statutory and common law, developed within each jurisdiction
separating legitimate picketing activities from those which were not
legally recognized. While the Supreme Court of the United States had
used its influence to set uniform confines beyond which picketing should
not be allowed to go, the states retained considerable freedom in defining
the objectives for which picketing could be undertaken.
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 73, for biographical data.
1 310 U.S. 88 (1940). justice McReynolds dissented without opinion. In a companion
case, Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940) the Court ruled equally invalid an
ordinance that, counsel argued, proscribed picketing only "for the purpose of persuading
others not to buy merchandise or perform services"-objectives thought the Court implicit
in all picketing.
2 310 U.S. at 104.
3 See the writer's forthcoming paper, Picketing as a Tort, 14 PinT. L. REv. - (1953).
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With the Thornhill case, all this was changed. The Court, by commissioning picketing to be a constitutionally protected medium of communication, bestowed upon itself the right to veto any restriction placed
on picketing, and thereby assumed, as it were, the power to rewrite the
law de novo.4 But how the new law would differ in detail from the old
was left largely obscure; the Court's language, in fact, gave ample
ground for either a broad or narrow interpretation.
In a well-known passage the Court said:
Abridgement of the liberty of [peaceful and truthful discussion on matters
of public interest] can be justified only where the clear danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances affording no opportunity to test
the merits of the ideas by competition for acceptance in the market of
public opinion. We hold that the danger of injury to an industrial concern is neither so serious or so imminent as to justify the sweeping proscription of freedom of discussion embodied in [the Alabama law.]r
This language led many commentators to believe that the court would
invalidate any limitations on the right to picket which were not warranted
by the clear and present danger test. If, on the other hand, the quoted
passage were treated as pure dictum, a more restricted reading of Thornhill v. Alabama followed. Confined narrowly to its facts, the case simply
held that blanket legislation banning all picketing was unconstitutional,
and not that all picketing was constitutionally protected. The Court
had taken pains to stress that the adoption of picketing into the free
speech family did not preclude limitations on the use and conduct of
the picket line. A state has the "power and the duty... to take adequate
steps to preserve the peace and to protect the privacy, the lives, and
the property of its residents.
...
-" The police power cannot be capriciously used, however, to tamper with freedom of speech. Alabama's antipicketing law, as it had been construed and applied, left no room for
4 The relationship between picketing and free speech had roots reaching deep into the
soil of precedent. See the writer's forthcoming paper, Picketing as Free Speech: Early
Stages in the Growth of the New Law of Picketing, 14 PiTT. L. RzV. - (1953).
5 310 U.S. at 104; at page 105 the Court added "no clear and present danger of
destruction of life or property, or breach of the peace can be thought to be inherent in
the activities of every person who approaches the premises of an employer and publicizes
the fact of a labor dispute involving the latter." Also see Carlson v. California, where
the Court said:
The power and duty of the State to take adequate steps to preserve the peace and
protect the privacy, the lives, and the property of its residents cannot be doubted.
But the ordinance in question here abridges liberty of discussion under circumstances
presenting no clear and present danger of substantive evils within the allowable area
of state control.
310 U.S. 106, 113 (1940).

6 310 U.S. at 105.
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. . . exceptions based upon either the number of persons engaged in the
proscribed activity, the peaceful character of their demeanor, the nature
of their dispute with an employer, or the restrained character and the
accurateness of the terminology used in notifying the public of the facts
of the dispute.7
Presumably, legislation specifically designed to check untruthful, disorderly, or mass picketing, or to prevent peaceful, truthful picketing
undertaken to advance certain socially undesirable purposes (which
the court did not attempt to define) would have a good chance of
meeting judicial approval.
The ringing phrases of the Thornhill decision left a host of crucial
questions unanswered. Basically, it remained to be seen whether the
broad or narrow interpretation of the holding would prevail. Could
stranger picketing be prohibited? Secondary picketing? Picketing to
achieve a closed shop or to force the discharge of non-union personnel?
Further, what did the court mean by "truthful" and "peaceful"?-the
history of picketing had demonstrated beyond cavil that these were
vague terms susceptible of widely varying interpretation. It is little
wonder that the clarification which the Thornhill case demanded and
which was certain to come was awaited with anticipation.

I
In Thornhill v. Alabama, the Supreme Court served notice, to vary the
metaphor, that it would personally fence off the area of constitutionally
protected picketing, and in that decision it drove in the first posts to
exclude blanket legislation prohibiting all picketing. Ten months elapsed
before the Justices went back to their fence-building. In the interim,
the state courts decided a number of picketing cases. Though in some
of these decisions, Thornhill v. Alabama was completely ignored,8 its
effects on the law of picketing were faced in twenty-odd others.
7 310 U.S. at 99.

8 Hinchley v. Amal. Meat Cutters, 7 L.R.R.M. 708, 3 CCH LAB. CAS. $60,838 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1941); Olson v. Bakery Drivers Local Union, 6 L.R.R.M. 1100 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1940); Stockinger v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 7 L.R.R.M. 722 (N.J. Ch. 1940);
Sunrise Dairy v. Local Union, 7 L.R.R.M. 722 (N.J. Ch. 1940); Dugan Bros. v. Local
Exec. Board, 6 L.R.R.M. 1141 (N.J. Ch. 1940); People v. Muller, 286 N.Y. 281, 36

N.E. 2d 206 (1941); Florsheim Shoe Co. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union, 24 N.Y.S.2d
923 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1940), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 188, 42 N.E. 2d 480 (1942); Nicholaus

v. John Doe, 175 Misc. 530, 24 N.Y.S.2d 258 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1941),
appeal dismissed, 261 App. Div. 1020, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 989 (3d Dep't 1941) ; Rubin v. Choina,
26 N.Y.S 2d 10 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1941); Bloedel Donovan Lumber Mills v.
Int'l Union, 4 Wash. 2d 62, 102 P. 2d 270 (1940); S & W Fine Foods Inc. v. Retail
Delivery Drivers Union, 6 L.R.R.M. 1112 (Wash. Super. Ct. 1940), rev'd on free speech
grounds, 11 Wash. 2d 262, 118 P. 2d 962 (1941), overruled in Building Serv. Employees
Int'l Union v. Gazzam, 29 Wash. 2d 488, 188 P. 2d 97 (1947).
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In Book Tower Garagev. Local Union,9 the Supreme Court of Michigan
abandoned the state's common law rule that all picketing was intimidatory
and therefore illegal. Conditions, reflected the court, have changed since
1898, when, in Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union," it had
judged all picketing an act of intimidation which constituted an unwarranted interference with the right of free trade. The factual conclusion of the Beck case that picketing in any form was inherently a
suggestion that force might be resorted to--"a subterfuge for unspoken
threats"-and could not be carried on peacefully, should not, the court
argued, control present-day experience which recognized that picketing
may be peaceably engaged in as a means of publicizing the facts of a
labor controversy. That the legislature had not changed the common
law rule of the Beck case, the opinion continued, did not compel adherence to that decision because the Supreme Court of the United
States has held peaceful picketing to make known the facts of a labor
dispute constitutionally protected. The Michigan Court on the same
.day, reversed a conviction for a misdemeanor based on peaceful picketing
on the ground that the law could not prohibit such activity. 1
E. L. Kearns Co. v. Landgraf12 marked a break in a long line of
cases in which New Jersey Equity had enjoined picketing carried on in
the absence of a strike between an employer and his employees. The
Kearns case involved the distribution of boycott circulars miles away
from the scene of the "dispute." In reversing an injunction against
passing out the pamphlets, the court cited Thornhill v. Alabama as
establishing the constitutional right to appeal to the public for assistance
in raising working standards even though no bona fide strike had been
called. But Washington's court of last resort in Shively v. Garage Employees' Local Union' (three judges dissenting), refused to believe that
the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court prevented a state from granting injunctive relief against peaceful
picketing by a union for a purpose which was illegal at common law,
9 295 Mich. 580, 295 N.W. 320 (1940).
10 118 Mich. 497, 77 N.W. 13 (1898).
11 People v. Bashaw, 295 Mich. 503, 295 N.W. 242 (1940).
12 128 NJ. Eq. 441, 16 A. 2d 623 (1940).
Is 6 Wash. 2d 560, 108 P. 2d 354 (1940), overruled in S & W Fine Foods Inc. v. Retail
Delivery Drivers Union, 11 Wash. 2d 262, 118 F. 2d 488 (1941), which was in turn overruled in Building Serv. Employees Union v. Gazzam, 29 Wash. 2d 488, 188 P. 2d 97 (1947).
Accord: Heine's Inc. v. Truck Drivers, 127 N.J.Eq. 514, 14 A. 2d 26 2 (1940), rev'd, 129
N.J. Eq. 308, 19 A. 2d 204 (1941); Kagan v. Amal. Meat Cutters Union, 7 L.R.R.M.
722 (N.J. Eq. 1940). See Feller v. Local Union, 7 L.R.R.M. 718 (N.J. Eq. 1940) (to force
observance of union standards), rev'd, 129 N.J. Eq. 421, 19 A. 2d 784 (1941).
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i.e. to compel an employer to sign a union shop agreement. Thornhill's
case, said the court, recognized that a state may place such reasonable
limits on speech.
Oregon's little Norris La Guardia Act, enacted in 1933, had been
initially construed to forbid injunctive relief against picketing in the
absence of a strike.' 4 The statute was amended in 1939 to permit the
enjoinder of picketing which was not undertaken in furtherance of a
"bona fide controversy in which the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and the majority of his employees and which
directly concerns matters directly pertaining to wages, hours, or working conditions."' 5 Is the Thornhill case inapplicable, 'asked the court,
because the Oregon law as amended does not prohibit all picketing?
Decidedly not."0 The statute was aimed at no specific evil and in substance deprived the minority, without justification, of fundamental rights
guaranteed to every person. Disorder, the court observed, is no more
likely when a majority pickets than when a minority does. A similar
stand had been taken in pre-Thornhill days in People v. Gidaly,1 7 but
never before had the highest court of a state invalidated as an unconstitutional infringement of freedom of speech a statute which did
8
not ban all picketing.'
Wisconsin's legislature in 1939, the year in which it drastically
weakened the state's anti-injunction statute, passed the Employment
Peace Act which made it an unfair labor practice for employees to
picket "unless a majority in a collective-bargaining unit of the employees of an employer against whom such acts are primarily directed
have voted by secret ballot to call a strike." 9 The validity of this
limitation on picketing was first argued before the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Hotel and Restaurant Employees International Alliance v.
WERB.2 0 The Board had issued a cease and desist order against
picketing by a union which was striking without compliance with the
requirements of the act. On appeal, the union attacked the Act as
unconstitutionally restricting freedom of speech. The Wisconsin legis14 George B. Wallace Co. v. Intl Ass'n, 155 Ore. 652, 63 P. 2d 1090 (1936).
10 Ore. Laws 1939, c. 2, §§ 1-8. See 2 TELLER, LABOR DisPuTEs AwD COLLECTIVE BARGAmING 1325-6 (1940).
16 American Federation of Labor v. Bain, 165 Ore. 183, 106 P. 2d 544 (1940).
17 35 Cal. App. 2d 758, 93 P. 2d 660 (1939).
18 Cf. People v. De Julis, 174 Misc. 994, 21 N.Y.S. 2d 995 (New Rochelle City Ct. 1940),
in which the court held an ordinance prohibiting the display of banners in public could
not constitutionally be applied to picketing even in the absence of a strike.
19 Wis. Laws 1939, c. 57, § 111.06, (2) (e).
20 236 Wis. 329, 294 N.W. 632 (1941), aff'd, 315 U.S. 437 (1942).
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lature, the court pointed out, had written into the Employment Peace
Act a clause explicitly denying any intention to impinge upon the right
of free speech. Alabama's legislature sought to prohibit picketing entirely, Wisconsin's merely to regulate it in the interest of peace, privacy
and property-matters held entitled to protection in Thornhill's case.
The court then made an ingenious, if totally unconvincing, attempt to
distinguish Hotel and R. E. I. Alliance v. WERB from Thornhill v.
Alabama. Freedom of speech, it argued, is not limited by the Act because
violations of the law, while unfair labor practices, may not be punished
as misdemeanors. A state, in other words, may restrict freedom of
speech as long as criminal proceedings are not utilized.'1 Almost as an
after thought, the court added that the picketing was unlawful because
conducted in large numbers and accompanied by violence. In denying
a rehearing, the court22 with a deft stroke reminiscent of Mr. Justice
Taft's revision of Hitckman. Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell' in Truax
24 asserted
v. Corrigan
that its opinion in Hotel & R. E. I. Alliance v.
WERB held the picketing disorderly and did not sanction any limitation
on peaceful picketing.
Picketing-free speech proved to be no bar to equitable relief in a
number of other cases. Injunctions were granted against picketing engaged in to induce the breach of an agreement between an employer and
another union,2 5 and to enforce the discharge of non-union employees.'
Courts restrained picketing to achieve a union shop, a closed shop, and
the observance of union standards.2 7 Equity prevented a union from
establishing a picket line at a time when the certification of an appropriate bargaining agent was pending before the state labor relations
M This argument also appears in Van Buskirk v. Sign Painters Local, 127 N.J. Eq. 533,
14 A. 2d 45 (1940) ; Suchodolski v. A.F. of L., 127 N.J. Eq. 511, 14 A. 2d 51 (1940). See
also Judge Blake's dissent in Shively v. Garage Employees Local Union, 6 Wash. 2d 560,
576, 108 P.2d 354, 361 (1940).
22 236 Wis. 329, 352, 295 N.W. 634 (1941).
23 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
24 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
2 Euclid Candy Co. v. Int'l Union, 6 L.R.R.M. 1139 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1940).
26 Suchodolski v. A.F. of L., 127 N.J. Eq. 511, 14 A. 2d 51 (1940); Schwab v. Moving
Picture Operators Local, 165 Ore. 602, 109 F. 2d 600 (1941).
27 Cooper v. Bldg. Trades Council, 7 L.R.R.M. 706, CCH LAB. CAs.
66,713 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1941); Heine's Inc. v. Truck Drivers, 127 N.J. Eq. 514, 14 A. 2d 262 (1940),
rev'd, 129 N.J. Eq. 308, 19 A. 2d 204 (1941) ; Feller v. Local Union, 7 L.R.R.M. 718 (N.J.
Eq. 1940), rev'd, 129 N.J. Eq. 421, 19 A. 2d 784 (1941); Kagan v. Amal. Meat Cutters
Union, 7 L.R.R.M. 722 (N.J. Eq. 1940); Schwab v. Motion Picture Operators Union, 165
Ore. 602, 109 P.2d 600 (1941).
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board,' and at a place removed from the employer's place of business.'
Picketing was enjoined because it did not publicize the facts of a labor
dispute,3 0 and, because in the absence of a bona fide dispute, it was a
nuisance.3 1
This examination of lower court decisions reveals that, in terms of
its immediate effects on the judiciary, Tkornhill v. Alabama was more
dud than bombshell. A surprisingly large number of courts ignored the
case completely. Most others, while admitting that Thornhill v. Alabama
imposed limitations on the power of the states to regulate peaceful
picketing, upheld as legitimate a variety of restrictions on its exercise.
The broad interpretation of the Tkornkill case that only the clear and
present danger test can justify restrictions on peaceful picketing attracted little support outside of Oregon.
Early in 1941, Mr. Justice Stone, concurring in United States v.
Hutckeson,32 stated as one reason for his belief that picketing in a
jurisdictional dispute was not a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act:
... the publication, unaccompanied by violence, of a notice that the employer is unfair to organized labor and requesting the public not to patronize
him is an exercise of the right of free speech guaranteed by the First
Amendment which cannot be made unlawful by an act of Congress.33
Mr. Justice Stone's broad reading of Thornhill v. Alabama passed largely
unnoticed, however, for on the very next Monday the Supreme Court handed down two decisions which, by implication at least, placed a narrower
gloss upon the picketing free-speech doctrine: Milk Wagon Drivers
Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies34 and American Federation of Labor v.
Swing.3 5
Meadowmoor Dairies sold milk products to vendors who in turn resold
them to retail stores. Members of the union supplied similar products to
consumers by door-to-door deliveries. The union claimed that the vendor
28 Hudson Recreation v. Bowling Employees Union, 39 Pa. D. & C. 655, CCH LAB.
CAs. $60,300 (1940).
20 Van Buskirk v. Sign Painters Local, 127 N.J. Eq. 533, 14 A. 2d 45 (1940).
30 Ibid. See also Cooper Co. v. Bldg. Trades Council, 7 L.R.R.M. 706, CCH LAB. CAs.
166,713 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1941).
31 Blonder v. United Retail Employees Union, 128 N.J.Eq. 41, 15 A. 2d 826 (1940),
rev'd 129 N.J. Eq. 424, 19 A. 2d 786 (1941); Miller's Inc. v. Journeymen Tailors Union,
128 N.J.Eq. 162, 15 A. 2d 822 (1940), rev'd mem. per curiam, 312 U.S. 658 (1941).
32 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
33 Id. at 243.
34 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
35 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
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system, by enabling retail stores to sell dairy products at cut-rate prices,
was undermining union working standards and jeopardizing the incomes
and jobs of its members. Pickets began patrolling the stores and continued until, upon the application of Meadowmoor, a preliminary injunction was issued restraining all picketing. The master in chancery,
to whom the case was referred for report, found that, although the
picketing itself had been peaceful, the dispute had been accompanied
by much disorder and violence, and recommended a permanent injunction forbidding all picketing. The trial court enjoined all acts of
violence, but refused to prohibit all picketing on the ground that a complete ban would have violated freedom of speech. The Supreme Court
of Illinois, reversing the lower court and holding that, because no "labor
dispute" was involved, the picketing sought to accomplish an unlawful
purpose, made permanent the preliminary injunction restraining all
picketing." The Illinois Court also held the manner of picketing illegal: the storekeepers were intimidated by the banners which, in view
of past disorders, signified that non-compliance with the pickets' demands
"would possibly be followed by acts of an unlawful character." The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter spoke for the majority, which included Mr.
Justice Murphy, the author of Tkornhill v. Alabama, in sustaining the
blanket injunction approved by the Illinois Supreme Court. Mr. Justice
Black (with Mr. Justice Douglas concurring) and Mr. Justice Reed
dissented. By upholding the conclusion of the Illinois court, and at
the same time disregarding (over Mr. Justice Black's protest) much
of its reasoning, Mr. Justice Frankfurter provided himself with the
opportunity to announce an important new principle in the development
of picketing-free speech: picketing "enmeshed" with violence is not
constitutionally protected.
The question, as he formulated it, was
...whether a state can choose to authorize its courts to enjoin acts of
conpicketing in themselves peaceful when they are enmeshed 3with
7
temporaneously violent conduct which is concededly outlawed.
Free speech, he argued in answering this question affirmatively, was
guaranteed because of "faith in the power of an appeal to reason by
all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind," and in order
to "avert force and explosions due to restriction upon rational modes of
communication." Peaceful picketing is assuredly "the workingman's
36 371 I1. 377, 21 N.E. 2d 308 (1939).
37 312 U.S. at 292.'
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means of communication," but "utterance in a context of violence can
lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become an instrument
The picket line is protected as long as it asks the public
of force."'
for support in bringing economic pressure to bear against an employer.
But once picketing becomes enmeshed in violence it ceases to be an
appeal for support and becomes a coercive device:
The picketing in this case was set against a background of violence.
In such a setting it could justifiably be concluded that the momentum
of fear generated by past violence would survive even though future picketing might be wholly peaceful. 3 9
A state, in other words, has the power to stop what would otherwise
be lawful picketing in order to prevent future intimidation. However, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter emphasized,
... the right of free speech cannot be denied by drawing from a trivial
rough incident or a moment of animal exuberation the conclusion that
otherwise peaceful picketing has the taint of force. .

.

. Right to free

speech in the future cannot be forfeited because of dissociated acts of
past violence. 40
Although this language would seem to impeach the Court's earlier holding
in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council4'
that a single act of violence can characterize a whole campaign as intimidatory and implies that the Constitution protects more than merely
nominal picketing, the Court did not take the position which a broad
interpretation of Thornhill v. Alabama would seem to have required
and insist that only a clear and present danger of disorder could justify
the enjoinder of all picketing.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, despite his utter contempt a decade earlier for
a "decree born of a chancellor's conscience," 42 could see nothing in the
Fourteenth Amendment which prevents a state "from placing confidence
in a chancellor's decree and compels it to rely exclusively on a
policeman's club." 43 The injunction here, he argued, is designed to fit
a "particular situation" and deals with a "narrow area." It is "the
very antithesis of a ban on all discussion." He considered the Illinois
injunction narrowly drawn to fit a concrete situation. If an injunction
is so misused as to make encroachments on freedom of speech, "the
Id. at 293.
39 Id. at 294.
40 Id. at 293, 296.
41 257 U.S. 184 (1921).
38

42 FRANxFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 81 (1930).

43 312 U.S. at 295.
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doors of this Court are always open."'
Neither Mr. Justice Reed nor Mr. Justice Black felt that the Meadowmoor injunction was drawn narrowly enough to avoid infringing upon
freedom of speech. Thousands of union members who were in no way
responsible for the disorders, they observed, were enjoined from picketing. Said Mr. Justice Black:
To sanction vague and undefined terminology in drag-net clauses directly
and exclusively aimed at restraining freedom of discussion upon the theory
that we might later acquit those convicted for violation 4of
such terminology
5
amounts in my judgment to a prior censorship of view.

A court decree, thought Mr. Justice Reed, because it restrains only
particular individuals is no less objectionable than a general statute
affecting everyone; the Constitution secures the basic freedoms to all.
Both Justices, furthermore, disagreed with the majority view that
nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment prevents a state from relying on
a "chancellor's decree" in restricting peaceful picketing. Mr. Justice
Reed admitted that inexcusable acts of violence had been committed,
but he denied that the right to picket peacefully could be destroyed by
past disorders:
If the fear engendered by past misconduct coerces storekeepers during
peaceful picketing, the46 remedy lies in the maintenance of order, not in the
denial of free speech.
An injunction against peaceful picketing is, he contended, an absolute
prohibition against speech, and
Free speech may be absolutely prohibited only under the most pressing
national emergencies. Those emergencies must be the kind that justify
the suspension of47the writ of habeas corpus or the suppression of the right
of trial by jury.

Mr. Justice Black, while agreeing with Mr. Justice Reed that picketing ought not to be lightly enjoined, was not willing to impose such
severe limitations on the police power. In his view, freedom of speech
could be subjected to prior restraint when a "clear and present danger
of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or
other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order appears.

....

,,48

But neither the findings nor the evidence in the Meadowmoor case, in
his opinion, disclosed a "clear and present danger" which justified an
abridgement of the right to picket.
4 Id. at 298.

4' Id.
46 Id.
-7 Id.
48 Id.

at
at
at
at

312.
319.
320.

316-7.
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Mr. Justice Black also took exception to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
novel principle that "a state can choose to authorize its courts to enjoin
acts of picketing in themselves peaceful when they are enmeshed with
contemporaneously violent conduct." He criticized this rule as so
sweeping and vague that "it opens up broad possibilities for invasion"
of freedom of speech.4 9 Repeating Mr. Justice Roberts' suggestion in
Cantwell v. Connecticu ° that legislation narrowly drawn to meet a
clear and present danger can authorize courts to step where they could
not otherwise constitutionally tread, he maintained that the courts in
the absence of guiding legislation ought not to be entrusted with the
power of enjoining peaceful picketing even when entangled with violence.
On the basis of judicial practices prior to 1933, there seemed good
reason to question the wisdom of bequeathing to the courts the power
to enjoin all picketing because of past disorders. Courts had for many
years seized upon minor incidents as sufficient reason for restraining all
picketing. 51 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, it is true, while he did say that
"a trivial rough incident," "a moment of animal exuberance," "episodic,"
"isolated," and "dissociated" acts of past violence could not be considered sufficient ground for enjoining all picketing, laid down no very
definite standards. It remained unclear whether courts had to find
that past disorders "would possibly be followed by acts of unlawful
character," were "so persistent, continuous, wanton, and flagrant as to
indicate the danger of continued illegal acts," 52 or "have been so great
and threatening that peaceful picketing is out of the question . . . that

no further chance is to be taken."" Yet
in such controversies, ruled Mr. Justice
unfounded. An examination of subsequent
although heavy reliance was placed upon the

history, the ultimate judge
Black's fears substantially
picketing cases reveals that
Meidowmoor rule in justify-

49 Id. at 303.

50 310 U. S. 296, 307, 311 (1940). See also Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252
(1941), where the Court stated at page 260 that when a legislature "has appraised a particular kind of situation and found a specific danger sufficiently imminent," the Court
tends to regard the judgments of the lower courts as "eifcased in armor wrought by prior
legislative deliberation."
61 See Note, 44 H-Lv. L. RaV. 971 (1931) ; 132 A.L.R. 1218.
52 Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees' Union, 281 N.Y. 150, 22 N.E. 2d 320
(1939). See judge Lehman's dissent, id. at 160, 22 N.E. 2d at 324. Also see May's Furs Inc.
v. Bauer, 282 N.Y. 331, 26 N.E. 2d 279 (1940), rehearing denied, 282 N. Y. 804, 27
N.E. 2d 210 (1940); Miller v. Gallagher, 176 Misc. 647, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 606 (1941).
53 Wise Shoe Co. v. Loewenthal, 266 N.Y. 264, 268, 194 N.E. 749, 750 (1935). But ef.
Steinkritz Amusement Corp. v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 294, 178 N.E. 11 (1931) ; Nann v. Raimist,
253, N.Y. 307, 174 N.E. 690 (1931); Exchange Bakery v. Rffkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 151 N.E.
130 (1927).
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ing blanket injunctions against picketing at some stage of more than
a dozen proceedings,5 4 in five instances, orders enjoining all picketing
were reversed or modified on appeal,55 and in two others the trial courts
themselves modified their restraining orders after periods of three56
and twenty months." In only a handful of cases is there substantial
58
reason to suspect that the Meadowmoor principle was misused.
Nowhere was the basic disagreement between majority and dissenters
in Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies put more pithily
than by Justice Reed, when he said, "In the last analysis we must ask
ourselves whether this protection against assumed fear of future coercion
flowing from past violence is sufficient to justify the suppression of
54 Hotel and Restaurant Employees Int'l Alliance v. Greenwood, 249 Ala. 265, 30 So.
2d 396 (1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948); Culinary Workers Union v. Busy Bee
Cafe, 57 Ariz. 514, 115 P. 2d 246 (1941); Henderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 214
Ark. 456, 217 S.W. 2d 261 (1949) ; Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int'l Alliance v. Jiannas,
211 Ark. 352, 200 S.W. 2d 763 (1947); Euclid Candy Co. v. Int'l Longshoremen & Warehousemen's Union, 49 Cal. App. 2d 137, 121 P. 2d 91 (1942); Pezold v. Amal. Meat
Cutters, 54 Cal. App. 2d 120, 128 P. 2d 611 (1942); Steiner v. Long Beach Local, 123
P. 2d 20 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1942); Moore v. City Dry Cleaners & Laundry, 41 So. 2d 865
(Fla. 1949); Ormerod v. Typographical Workers Union, 27 L.R.R2..
2508 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
1951); Maywood Farms Co. v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union, 316 Ill. App. 47, 43 N.E.2d
700 (1942); Enterprise Window Cleaning Co. v. Slowuta, 299 N.Y. 286, 86 N.E. 2d
750 (1949) (disorderly picketing was only one of the issues involved); Jones v. Int'l
Ass'n of Machinists, 75 N.E. 2d 446 (Ohio C.P. 1947); Rowe Transfer & Storage Co. v.
Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 186 Tenn. 265, 209 S.W. 2d 35 (1948); Moulders Union
v. Texas Foundaries Inc., 28 L.R.R.M. 2300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); International Ass'n
of Carpenters and Joiners v. Sharp, 202 S.W. 2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). In a large
number of other cases prayers for blanket injunctions under the Meadowmoor rule were
rejected by the trial court as not supported by sufficient evidence. See, e.g., Local 802
v. Asinos, 216 Ark. 694, 227 S.W. 2d 154 (1950); Mason and Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Odom,
193 Ga. 471, 18 S.E. 2d 841 (1942); Ellingsen v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union, 377 Ill.
76,
35 N.E. 2d 709 (1941); Lawrence Avenue Building Corp. v. Van Heck, 377 InI. 37, 35
N.E. 2d 373 (1941) ; East Lake Drug Co. v. Union, 210 Minn. 433, 298 N.W. 722 (1941);
Weyerhauser Timber Co. v. Dist. Council, 11 Wash. 2d 503, 119 P. 2d 643 (1941).
5 Hotel and Restaurant Employees Int'l Alliance v. Greenwood, 249 Ala. 265, 30
So. 2d 396 (1947) (reversed), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948); Culinary Workers Union
v. Busy Bee Cafe, 57 Ariz. 514, 115 P. 2d 246 (1941) (reversed); Pezold v. Amal. Meat
Cutters, 54 Cal. App. 2d 120, 128 P. 2d 611 (1942) (reversed), Rowe Transfer & Storage
Company v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 186 Tenn. 265, 209 S.W. 2d 35 (1948)
(modified); Moulders Union v. Texas Foundries Inc., 28 L.R.R.M. 2300 (Tex. Civ. App.
1951) (modified).
568 Jones v. Intl Ass'n of Machinists, 75 N.E. 2d 446 (Ohio C.P. 1947).
67 Henderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 214 Ark. 456, 217 S.W. 2d 261 (1949).
58 Hotel & Restaurant Employees Intl Alliance v. Jiannas, 211 Ark. 352, 200 S.W. 2d
763 (1947); Steiner v. Long Beach Local, 19 Cal. 2d 676, 123 P.2d 20 (1942); Maywood
Farms Co. v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union, 316 Ill.
App. 47, 43 N.E. 2d 700 (1942);
International Ass'n of Carpenters and Joiners v. Sharp, 202 S.W. 2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947); Moore v. City Dry Cleaners & Laundry, 41 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1949).
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free speech." 59 Justices Frankfurter, Murphy, Stone, Hughes, Jackson,
and Roberts voted in the affirmative, with Justices Black, Douglas and
Reed, who refused to agree that speech could be constitutionally restricted for so tenuous a reason, in opposition. 0
Mr. Justice Frankfurter once again spoke for the Court in American
Federationof Labor v. Swing.6 1 Pickets had patrolled before a beauty
shop in an effort to unionize its employees. The owner successfully
sought an injunction against the picketing as libelous, disorderly, and
as an interference with the freedom of his workers to remain unorganized.
The Supreme Court, after picking its way through a complex and
"none too clear record," decided that the permanent injunction which
had finally been issued "rested on the explicit avowal that 'peaceful
persuasion' was forbidden in this case because those-enjoined were not
in Swing's employ."
We are asked to sustain a decree which for purposes of this case asserts
as the common law of a state that there can be no "peaceful picketing
or peaceful persuasion" in relation to any dispute between an employer
and a trade union unless the employer's own employees are in controversy
with him.
Such a ban of free62 communication is inconsistent with the guarantee of
freedom of speech.

A state's power "to regulate, the local problems thrown up by modern
industry and to preserve the peace," Mr. Justice Frankfurter maintained,
is not "unfettered by the requirements of the Bill of Rights.1 63 Neither

legislature nor judiciary can deprive workingmen of the right to speak
and picket merely "by drawing the circle of economic competition between employers and workers so small as to contain only an employer
and those directly employed by him." ' 4 Freedom of speech, he concluded
can no more be denied to stranger pickets than to all strikers because
all persons engaged in the "same industry" have an "interdependence
of economic interest."
Swing's case, if Thornhill v. Alabama is interpreted narrowly, rep56 312 U.S. at 320.
60 Strong criticism of the Meadowmoor rule may be found in Note, 41 CoL. L. REv.
726 (1940), and Note, 40 MIcH. L. REv. 1200 (1942).
61 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
62 312 U.S. at 325 (1941).

Justices Frankfurter, Murphy, Stone, Jackson, and Reed

formed the majority. Justices Black and Douglas concurred without separate opinion.
Not at all certain that the final decree had not been granted as a result of libelous and
disorderly conduct as well, Justices Roberts and Hughes dissented.
63 312 U.S. at 325.
64 Id. at 326.
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resented a considerable extension of the law. In the Thornhill case,
the Court had decided that a state could not prohibit picketing per se;
in the Swing case it added: even in the absence of a dispute between
an employer and his employees. Before Thornhill's case only five states
had permitted picketing in the absence of a strike.6 5 After the Swing
decision a number of state courts overruled their previous decisions
prohibiting picketing in the absence of a dispute between an employer
and his actual employees.66
Considered more broadly, however, American Federation of Labor
v. Swing, and the Meadowmoor case as well, marked a distinct retreat
from Thornkill v. Alabama. The Supreme Court in Thornkill's case
had more or less promised to determine the constitutionality of picketing
by the clear and present danger test. In neither the Swing nor Meadowmoor cases did the majority honor that pledge. Justices Black and Douglas were admittedly of the opinion that the danger of intimidation because of past violence was neither clear nor present. There is no readily
apparent reason, however, why the Court could not have concluded in
the Meadowmoor case that the union's conduct created a clear and
present danger that all future picketing would intimidate the storekeepers. The clear and present danger test is no judicial litmus paper
invariably yielding an indisputable answer. It is at best a useful guide
in evaluating facts and in no instance dispenses with the necessity for
value judgments. Applied in Swing's case, the clear and present danger
test could not have led the Court to a different conclusion unless all
stranger picketing were held to be a substantive evil. The hasty abandonment of the clear and present danger test, while it probably had no effect
on the actual outcome of either the Swing or the Meadowmoor cases, was,
65 New York, Oregon, Montana, Colorado, and Wisconsin. Actually Wisconsin by
legislation made picketing in the absence of a strike an unfair labor practice in 1939.
Although the Act was not so construed until some time after Swing's case had been decided.
For citations see 1 TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLFiCTIVE BARGAUq=G 357 (1940).
66 See e.g., Arizona-: Culinary Workers v. Busy Bee Cafe, 57 Ariz. 514, 115 P. 2d 246
(1941). Connecticut: Loew's Enterprises, Inc. v. Int'l Alliance, 127 Conn. 415, 17 A.2d
525 (1941); Illinois: Lawrence Avenue Building Corp. v. Van Heck, 377 fI1. 37, 35
N.E. 2d 373 (1941); Indiana: Davis v. Yates, 218 Ind. 364, 32 N.E. 2d 86 (1941);
Kentucky: Blanford v. Press Publishing Co., 286 Ky. 657, 151 S.W. 2d 440 (1941) ; Michigan:
Harper v. Brennan, 311 Mich. 489, 18 N.W. 2d 905 (1945) (dictum); New Jersey: Heine's
Inc. v. Truck Drivers and Helpers' Union, 129 N.J. Eq. 308, 19 A. 2d 204 (1941); Feller
v. Int'l L.G.W. Union, 129 N.J. Eq. 421 19 A. 2d 784 (1941); Washington: S & W Fine
Foods Inc. v. Retail Delivery Drivers Union, 11 Wash. 2d 262, 118 P.2d 488 (1941),
overruled in Building Service Employees Int'l Union v. Gazzam, 29 Wash. 2d 488, 188
P.2d 97 (1947); West Virginia: Blossom Dairy Co. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters,
125 W. Va. 165, 23 S.E. 2d 645 (1942).
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nevertheless, of the greatest significance. A uniform application of the test
to picketing, the Court apparently realized, by preventing regulation of
the objectives for which picketing could be undertaken, might frequently
lead to economically undesirable results. But although it ignored the
test, the Court gave no indication that it ceased to consider the picket line
a constitutionally protected medium of communication.67 On the contrary,
in American Federationof Labor v. Swing, picketing, explicitly because
it was a form of free speech, was afforded additional protection.
The proposition of the Swing case-that a blanket proscription of
stranger picketing was a violation of constitutionally protected speech
because all persons "engaged in the same industry" hold some common
economic interests-left two matters unresolved. First, the Court made
no effort to define with precision "the interdependence of economic
interests of all engaged in the same industry." A state clearly could
not draw the circle of economic competition so narrowly as to exclude
all stranger picketing. Yet, the Court's intention not to insist upon a
circle large enough to enable any worker to picket any employer was
unmistakable. Without doubt, in the absence of a "proper" economic
relationship, the most peaceable picketing could be constitutionally prohibited. A Texas appellate court recognized this in two decisions rendered
a few days later." Second, could picketing be prohibited if undertaken for
an unlawful objective? In American Federationof Labor v. Swing, as
in Thornhill v. Alabama, the Court studiously avoided any statement
concerning the legitimate objectives of picketing. Thus the loophole
that enabled courts after Thornhill's case to enjoin picketing by finding
it to be in furtherance of an unlawful purpose remained just as gaping,
and several state courts in the months immediately following the Swing
decision found peaceable picketing to be enjoinable because conducted
in pursuance of illegal ends. 69 A large majority, however, ignored the
67

The number of free speech cases in which the clear and present danger test, while

applicable, was not employed is legion. See Antieau, The Rule of Clear and Present Danger:
Scope of its Applicability, 48 MicHr. L. REv. 811 (1950).
68 Carpenters &'Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 149 S.W. 2d 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941),
rehearingdenied, at 698, aff'd, 315 U.S. 722 (1942); Borden Co. v. Local 133, 152 S.W. 2d
828 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
69 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that picketing to enforce a
closed shop contract would require the employer to commit an unfair labor practice in
violation of the state's labor relations act, and therefore could be constitutionally enjoined.
R.H. White Co. v. Murphy, 310 Mass. 510, 38 N.E. 2d 685 (1942). Wisconsin's highest
court denied that free speech was infringed by an injunction to compel the signing of an
all-union agreement without first complying with the State's Employment Peace Act.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v. Milk & Ice Cream Drivers Union, 238 Wis.
379, 299 N.W. 31 (1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 668 (1942). Kentucky's Supreme Court,
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pickets' objectives and refused to issue restraining orders against
picketing primary employers whether by their own employees or by
strangers. 0 Scarcely a year after the Swing decision, 7' two cases certified
for review, Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe72 and Bakery
& Pastry Drivers Union v. Wohl7 offered the Court an opportunity to

address itself to the questions of how narrowly a state could confine the
circle of economic competition, and whether picketing objectives could
be constitutionally outlawed.
The Ritter case originated from a controversy between a non-union
contractor named Plaster and two building-trades unions. Ritter, a
restaurateur who employed union help in his cafe, engaged Plaster
to erect a building "wholly unconnected with the business of the Cafe"
at a site a mile and a half from it. The unions, objecting to Plaster's
use of non-union labor, picketed the cafe in a truthful and peaceful
as dictum, asserted that picketing to further a combination in restraint of trade was
unlawful, Blanford v. Press Publishing Co., 286 Ky. 657, 151 S.W.2d 440 (1941), and in
Washington the enjoinder of picketing that was part of a conspiracy to force a breach of
contract was held not to deprive the pickets of freedom of speech. Sears v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 8 Wash. 2d 447, 112 P. 2d 850 (1941). Finally, a Texas appellate
court aplproved an order restraining workers on strike against a dairy company from
picketing the stores retailing its products. Borden Co. v. Local 133, 152 S.W. 2d 828
(Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
70 Equitable relief against picketing for the following purposes was denied: to force
a self-employer to maintain union hours, Baker v. Retail Clerks Int'l Protective Ass'n,
313 Ill. App. 432, 40 N.E. 2d 571 (1942); to force non-union employees into the union,
Denver Local Union v. Buckingham Transp. Co., 108 Colo. 419, 118 P. 2d 1088 (1941);
Ellingsen v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union, 377 Ill. 76, 35 N.E. 2d 349 (1941); Lawrence
Avenue Building Corp. v. Van Heck, 377 Ill. 37, 35 N.E. 2d 373 (1941); Friedman v.
Blumberg, 342 Pa. 387, 23 A. 2d 412 (1941); S & W Fine Foods Inc. v. Retail Delivery
Drivers & Salesmen's Union, 11 Wash. 2d 262, 118 P.2d 962 (1941); to compel a selfemployer to join a union, O'Neil v. Building Service Employees Int'l Union, 9 Wash. 2d
507, 115 P. 2d 662 (1941); to force an employer to change his method of doing business
because it hurt the union, Edwards v. Teamsters Union, 8 Wash. 2d 492, 113 P. 2d 28
(1941); to require stores renting burglar alarms to have them serviced exclusively by the
union even though the rental fee included free non-union service, People v. Muller, 286
N.Y. 284, 36 N.E. 2d 206 (1941); to make an employer break a collective bargaining
agreement with a majority union (not yet certified) and recognize a minority union
instead, Weyerhauser Timber Co. v. Dist. Council, 11 Wash. 2d 503, 119 P.'2d 643 (1941).
71 During this period the Court in a per curiam memorandum opinion, 312 U.S. 658
(1941), citing the Thornhill and Sing cases, reversed Miller's Inc. v. journeymen Tailors
Union, 128 N.J. Eq. 165, 15 A. 2d 822 (1940), a case in which the New Jersey Court of
Chancery held the Constitution does not protect picketing in the absence of a "labor
dispute." Similarly, in another per curiam memorandum decision, 313 U.S. 548 (1941),
the Court summarily reversed Bakery & Pastry Drivers Union v. Wohl, 284 N.Y. 788,
31 N.E. 2d 765 (1940). A petition for rehearing the Wohl case, however, was subsequently
granted, 314 U.S. 701 (1941).
72 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
73 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
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manner. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals,7 in a decision which the
Supreme Court of the United States sustained by a vote of five to four,7
held that the picketing was an illegal restraint of trade in violation of
the State's anti-trust laws. The Fourteenth Amendment declared Mr.
Justice Frankfurter for the Court, does not prohibit a state from localizing an industrial conflict in the manner in which Texas had. The state
had prevented unions in controversy with a building contractor from
picketing a restaurant owned by a person who contracted with the
builder. Under these circumstances the state simply forbade the "conscription of neutrals" having "no relation to either the dispute or the
industry in which it arose."' 76 The contractor, not the cafe-owner, was
the real adversary of the unions. The situation which had been involved
in Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. Wol, Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed
out in his Ritter opinion, was quite different. 71 In the Wohl case, a
bakery drivers' union was in dispute with two independent peddlers,
Wohl and Platzman. When the peddlers refused to accede to the union's
demand that they hire an unemployed union member as a relief worker
on one day each week, the union, in order to bring secondary pressure
upon them, picketed the manufacturing bakers from whom Wohl
and Platzman bought products and threatened to picket the retail
78
stores to which they sold them. The New York Court of Appeals
approved an injunction against all picketing on the ground that "no
labor dispute" was involved under the state's anti-injunction statutean injunction which the United States Supreme Court dissolved as an
unconstitutional infringement on speech." The businesses picketed in
the Wohl case, asserted Mr. Justice Frankfurter, were "directly involved in the dispute. In picketing the retail establishments, the union
members would only be following the subject-matter of their dispute."8' 0
Texas, in the Ritter case, did not attempt to prevent the unions from
picketing "other business enterprises of the building contractor." If
it had, other problems would have been involved.
Much of the difficulty which commentators have found in correlating
the Ritter case with the Swing and Wokl decisions results, the writer
74 Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 149 S.W. 2d 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941),
rehearing denied, at 698.
76 315 U.S. 722 (1942). Justices Frankfurter, Stone, Byrnes, Jackson and Roberts
formed the majority, with Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Reed dissenting.
76 Id. at 728.
77 Id. at 727.
78 284 N.Y. 788, 31 N.E. 2d 765 (1940).
79 315 U.S. 769 (1942).

80 Id. at 727.
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believes, from interpreting Mr. Justice Frankfurter's designation of
Ritter as a neutral to be a vital factor in his decision that Ritter's cafe
could not be picketed. Peaceful picketing, the Justice wrote, is one of
the media whereby "workingmen communicate their grievances."8 1
Nonetheless, picketing is also, in the Justice's pungent term, a method
of "conscription" and the states are not required by the Constitution
"to allow the disputants in a particular industrial episode to conscript
neutrals having no relation to either the dispute or the industry in which
it arose."82 Mr.Justice Frankfurter, it is suggested, was employing the
word "neutral" in the same sense in which he and Greene seem to have
used it in The Labor Injunction: to refer to anyone not an actual party to
a labor dispute.' Thus defined, "neutral" implies no necessary conclusion concerning the right to picket a person designated a neutral;
third parties are subject to picketing, and whether they may or may not
be picketed in a particular case depends upon the character of their
economic relation to the primary parties to a labor dispute-the principle which Mr. Justice Frankfurter applied in theRitter decision. Generally, the word "neutral" is used quite differently. Hellerstein, and
most others, would treat as neutrals only those (if any there be) who
are not in a position to aid either party to a labor dispute and therefore
ought to be immune from picketing. 4 When the term is used in this
sense, Ritter cannot possibly be considered a neutral and Mr. Justice
Frankfurter did not suggest that he could. Texas could constitutionally
immunize Ritter from picketing, not because he was unable to exert
economic pressure upon the contractor whom he had hired to build his
house, but because his relationship to the dispute between the contractor
and the union was relatively remote.
The Supreme Court apparently felt that the states 5 ought to be al81 Id. at 727.
82 Id. at 728. In the Wohl case Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, wrote:
Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since it invokes patrol of
a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of
one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being
disseminated.
Id. at 776.
83 FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INyuNCT ON 45 (1930).

84 See Hellerstein, Secondary Boycotts in Labor Disputes, 47 YALE L. J. 341, 354 (1938).
Also Cushman and Herrick, Re-examination of Picketing and Free Speech, 34 CORNELL L.Q.
81, 86 (1948); GREGORY AND KATz, LABOR LAW:

CAsES MATERIALs AND COincENTS 361

et seq. (1948).
85 New York Courts have developed a "unity of interest" doctrine whereby they
decide whether the economic relationship between pickets and those picketed is close
enough to foreclose equitable relief. See the leading case of Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276
N.Y. 281, 11 N.E. 2d 307 (1937).

A short history of "unity of interest" may be found in
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lowed the power to prevent pickets from levelling economic pressure
against third parties having no close relationship to a particular controversy. At the same time it denied the power to draw the circle
of economic competition so narrowly as to insulate parties vitally
associated with a labor controversy from the pressures of the picket
line. But, the criteria for applying the Ritter formula remained
elusive indeed. As Mr. Justice Reed stressed in his dissent, the Court
had not made clear the method for determining whether the necessary
interdependence of economic interest exists or even what it meant by
80
"industry."
The decision in the Wohl case was written by Mr. Justice Jackson.
The New York Courts, he argued, cannot prevent a union from picketing merely because no "labor dispute" is involved:
.. one need not be in a "labor dispute" as defined by state law to have
a right under the Fourteenth Amendment to express a grievance in a labor
matter by publication unattended
by violence, coercion, or conduct others
wise unlawful or oppressive. 7
The Court in the above sentence gave cause for suspicion that peaceful
picketing could be enjoined if undertaken for a purpose labeled "unlawful." The probability that this was exactly what the Court intended
was immeasurably increased by the dictum which followed. Respondents had argued that the New York Court of Appeals did in fact consider that the picketing had been conducted for an unlawful purpose,
and pointed to that court's language in Opera on Tour v. Webber"8 in
substantiation. Mr. Justice Jackson, however, dismissed the Webber
dictum as lacking "the deliberation and formality of a certification." 9
To this rather strong hint that the Court might well consider picketing
for an unlawful purpose devoid of constitutional protection,9 the
Barnard and Graham, Labor and the Secondary Boycott, 15 WAsn. L. REv. 137, 155 (1940).
Also see Hellerstein, 47 YALE L. J. 341, 354; Editor's Note, 15 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 327,
329 (1947).
88 315 U.S. 722, 739.
87 315 U.S. 769, 774.
88 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E. 2d 349 (1941), where the court said:
So, too, in a case unanimously decided, we held that it was an unlawful labor objective
to attempt to coerce a peddler employing no employees in his business and making
approximately thirty-two dollars a week, to hire an employee at nine dollars a day
for one day a week.
Id. at 357, 34 N.E. 2d 349, 353 (1941).
89 315 U.S. at 774.
90 On the same day the Court in Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. WERB, 315 U.S.

740 (1942), sustained an injunction approved by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin enjoining among other things picketing the homes of non-striking employees during a labor
dispute.
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Justice appended a somewhat confusing conclusion. Its upshot seems
to be this: peaceful picketing, if it seriously affects the interests of
third parties, loses its constitutional immunity. This prompted Mr.
Justice Douglas, who with Justices Black and Murphy urged resuscitation of the clear and present danger test,91 to protest:
If the opinion in this case means that a State can prohibit picketing
when it is effective but may not prohibit it when it is ineffective, then
I think we have made a basic departure from Tkornhill v. Alabama .... 92
In Ritter and Wokl, as in Meadowmoor and Swing, the majority ignored the clear and present danger test. Application of the test, although
it would no more have altered the result in Bakery and Pastry Drivers
Union v. Wohl than in American Federation of Labor v. Swing, would
most probably have caused a reversal of Carpenters & Joiners Union
v. Ritter's Cafe. The Court in the Wohl and Ritter cases preferred
to assay the validity of restraints upon all picketing within a given
area by what has been aptly designated the "reasonable basis" test.3
According to this test, whether or not a state could ban all picketing
within a particular area would depend on a careful balancing of community interests--of which speech was one and the confining of the
scope of economic conflict another. Picketing, in the absence of a close
economic relationship between the parties involved, would fall outside
91 Mr. Justice Douglas wrote:
While we recognized that picketing could be regulated, we stated [in Thornhill v.
Alabama] (p. 104-105): "Abridgement of the liberty of such discussion can be
justified only where the clear danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances
affording no opportunity to test the merits of the ideas by competition for acceptance
in the market of public opinion." And we added (p. 105): "But no clear and present
danger of destruction of life or property, or invasion of the right of privacy or breach
of the peace can be thought to be inherent in the activities of every person who
approaches the premises of an employer and publicizes the facts of a labor dispute
involving the latter." For that reason we invoked the test, employed in comparable
situations (Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307; Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252) that the statute which is the source of the restriction on free speech must
be "narrowly drawn to cover the precise situation giving rise to the danger." p. 105.
. . . But the [New York) statute is not a regulation of picketing per se-narrowly
drawn, of general application, and regulating the use of the streets by all picketeers.
In substance it merely sets apart a particular enterprise and frees it from all picketing.
If the principles of the Thornhiil case are to survive, I do not see how New York can
be allowed to draw that line.
315 U. S. at 776-77. Cf. the words of Mr. Justice Reed, dissenting in the Ritter Case:
The decision withdraws federal constitutional protection from the freedom of workers
outside an industry to state their side of a labor controversy by picketing. So long
as civil government is able to function normally for the protection of its citizens,
such a limitation upon free speech is unwarranted.
315 U.S. 722, 739.
92 315 U.S. at 775.
93 See Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51 (D. C. Kan. 1945). The court applied the
phrase to the rationale of the Ritter case alone.
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the area of constitutionally protected speech. The Wohl decision precluded blanket prohibition of picketing which followed an "unfair"
product;, the Ritter case held picketing a third party (merely because
he happened to be in a position to exert economic pressure upon an
actual party to a dispute) outside the pale of immunity. But rather
than lay down a rule of thumb for determining in future cases whether
the relationship between picketer and picketed was integral enough
to forbid the interdiction of all picketing, the Court seemed resolute
to proceed cautiously from case to case. The validity of prohibitions
on the scope of picketing which did not lie within the areas already demarcated by the Ritter and Wohl cases would be determined by evaluating community interests and by deciding whether the restrictions were
reasonable. If a "reasonable basis" test were to be substituted for the
clear and present danger test, or the "same industry" rule, there is much
to justify the way in which both the Wohl and Ritter cases were decided.
But certainly Mr. Justice Frankfurter overstated the logic of the Court's
position when he insisted in the Ritter case that to hold that the Constitution forbids "Texas to draw the line which has been drawn
here . . . would be to transmute vital constitutional liberties into doc-

trinaire dogma." 4 The narrow rulings in Thornhill v. Alabama and
American Federation of Labor v. Swing remained good law: no total
prohibition of picketing whether by bona fide employees or strangers
was permissible.
Some months later the Court, in Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos,95 applied both the Meadowmoor principle, allowing the complete
prohibition of peaceful picketing enmeshed with violence, and the RitterWohl rationale that where a close economic relation exists between the
picketer and the picketed no total ban on picketing is constitutionally
permissible, to upset an injunction against picketing granted by the
New York courts. Members of a union had paraded before a cafeteria
operated by its several partner-owners without the help of employees.
The New York Court of Appeals sustained the lower courts' findings
that the pickets had misrepresented the partners and had insulted their
customers.2 0 Even were this not the case, equitable relief could be
properly granted because no "labor dispute" existed under the provisions
of Section 876-a of the Civil Practice Act. The United States Supreme
Court, through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, held that the injunction violated
94 315 U.S. 722, 728.
95 320 U.S. 293 (1943).

06 Angelos v. Mesevich, 289 -N.Y. 498, 46 N.E. 2d 903 (1943).
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free speech. The picketing could not be enjoined as improperly conducted:
...to use loose language or undefined slogans that are part of the conventional give-and-take in our economic and political controversies-like
"unfair" or "fascist"-is not to falsify facts.07
There is no constitutional right to misrepresent and coerce, but such
conduct can not cause the forfeiture of the right to picket. States under
the Meadowmoor doctrine may prohibit picketing in order to prevent
future coercion, but "the right to picket itself [cannot] be taken away
merely because there may have been isolated incidents of abuse falling
far short of violence occurring in the course of that picketing." ' Nor
was the absence of a "labor dispute" as defined by state law of significance. Once again the oft-cited magic words appear: a state cannot
outlaw picketing simply "by drawing the circle of economic competition
between employers and workers so small as to contain only an employer
and those directly employed by him." 99 Here no "neutrals" or third
parties were involved, and the economic relationship between the selfemployers and the union which would like to relieve them of their
functions as laborers was presumably a close one. Picketing selfemployers was as much constitutionally protected against a blanket ban
as stranger picketing for organizational purposes and the following of
an "unfair" product.

II
After the Angelos decision, the Justices retreated to the isolation of
their chambers for more than half a decade and left the states to interpret the Court's picketing-free speech opinions as they saw fit."° Two
possible courses of action remained open to states desirous of regulating
peaceful picketing. A state might limit the scope of permissible picketing by prohibiting all patrolling' in areas of labor controversy in which
K 320 U.S. at 295.
98 Id. at 296.
99 Id.
100 The Court, while it did hear arguments in a potentially important picketing case in

1947, United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947), neatly side-stepped for a time the
necessity for subjecting its picketing-free speech pronouncements to a searching reappraisal.
In 1946, Congress amended the Communications Act of 1934 by making it a criminal
offense to coerce a licensee into submitting to featherbedding and similar practices. The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois offered as one reason for
invalidating the law its conviction that the statute abridged free speech by outlawing
peaceful picketing. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court, in refusing to hold the statute
invalid on its face, pointed out that the word "picketing" did not appear in the amendment.
The law, the Court argued, had not yet actually been applied and the justices had no
intention of deciding whether the law was invalid as a district attorney proposed to apply it.
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the Supreme Court had declared or was likely to declare that no close
interdependence of economic interest existed between the pickets and
those picketed. Or, a state might maintain that until the Supreme Court
made a definite pronouncement to the contrary, peaceful picketing for
"unlawful objectives" could be prohibited: the Swing, Ritter, Wohl, and
Angelos cases all had been concerned with the question, "Who may
picket whom?" and the answer to the other important question, "For
what purposes may picketing be undertaken?" remained obscure. The
lower courts' decisions in the years after the Wohl and Ritter cases
may be said to follow one or the other of the foregoing alternatives
in limiting peaceful picketing. It would be inaccurate, however, to
insist that all the lower courts explicitly recognized this division and
consciously took one path or the other. Consequently, some decisions
must be arbitrarily placed in one category or the other.
Blanket Restrictions on the Scope of Picketing
The cases in the first category, the regulation of picketing by means
of blanket restrictions on its scope, arose in two ways.
1) Constitutionality of Legislation Curtailing Picketing: State labor
legislation resulted in a group of cases challenging the constitutionality of new statutory limitations which curtailed the scope of picketing. The Supreme Court of Colorado found that the state's Labor Peace
Act which limited picketing to members of incorporated unions an infringement of free speech.' 01 California's broadly drafted "hot cargo
act,'M0 2 which permitted the enjoinder of picketing directly or indirectly
resulting in a boycott of third parties, and a similar section of the
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act,' were struck down as so vague and
sweeping as to violate the constitutional right to disseminate the facts
of a labor controversy. Missouri's Madison Act, a June 30, 1947, amendment to the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act, and Article 515f of the
Texas Civil Statutes prohibited picketing in the absence of a dispute
101 American Federation of Labor v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 9, 155 P. 2d 145 (1945).
102 CAL. LAB. CODE §§

1131-1136 (Deering 1944); In re Blaney, 30 Cal. 2d 643, 184 P. 2d

892 (1947). The court said:
The legislature manifestly sought, in the instant case, to prohibit every form of boycott, including some kinds which are occasionally characterized as "primary" ...
Only by a carefully drawn statute which separately treats the various forms of concerted action loosely termed "secondary boycotts" can the legislature hope to accomplish
the object of regulating those forms which may ultimately be held within its constituted
power.
Id. at 658, 184 P. 2d at 902.
:103 PA. STAT. tit.
43, § 211 et seq. (1941) ; Labor Relations Board v. Counties Union,
361 Pa. 246, 64 A. 2d 834 (1949).
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between an employer and his employees. The Supreme Court of Missouri found such a provision unconstitutional, °4 and the Texas'o, and
Pennsylvania 0 8 Supreme Courts followed suit. Observed the Pennsylvania court:
...[the statute] ...leaves room for no exceptions based upon the lawfulness of the purpose of the picketing, its peaceful character, or the circumstances that the picketers have a legitimate economic interest to0 7advance
thereby, arising from their employment in the industry affected.'
The Utah Labor Relations Act declared picketing an unfair labor
practice unless conducted by a certified union in connection with a
strike approved by a majority of the workers on a secret ballot. Her
court of last appeal, rather than invalidate the statute, virtually rewrote
it.'0 8 A clause in the law piously proclaiming the legislature's intention
not to interfere with free speech clearly indicated, felt the court, that
the limitations on picketing applied only to such picketing as was not
constitutionally protected. In Florida, the legislature passed a law
making it illegal "to participate in any strike, walkout, or cessation of
work or continuation thereof without the same being authorized by a
majority vote of the employees to be governed thereby. . . .", This
provision was held, in Whitehead v. Miami Laundry Co.,"' not to ban
picket lines because picketing as a form of speech is constitutionally
protected even in the absence of a legal strike. In Lash v. State,"' the
Alabama Supreme Court, while it refused upon receipt of a certified
question to void an apparently blanket prohibition of picketing, did
issue a warning that the act must not be applied in contravention of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
On the other hand, several decisions upholding blanket prohibitions
on peaceful picketing without regard for the interdependence of economic interest seem incompatible with the Wohl and Ritter cases. The
highest court of Wisconsin with but slight deference to the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court, accepted the state's Employment
104 Ex parte Hun, 257 Mo. 256, 207 S.W. 2d 468 (1948).

-15International
(1949).
108 See note 103
107 361 Pa. 246,
108 International

Union of Operating Engineers v. Cox, 148 Tex. 42, 219 S.W. 2d 787
supra.
263, 64 A. 2d 834, 841-42 (1948).
Union v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 115 Utah 183, 203 P. 2d 404

(1949).
109 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 481.09 (3) (1941).
110 160 Fla. 667, 36 So. 2d 382 (1948).
111 244 Ala. 48, 14 So. 2d 229 (1943). Accord: Sachs Quality Furniture, Inc. v. Hensley,
269 App. Div. 264, 55 N.Y.S. 2d 450 (1st Dep't 1945). Cf. Society of New York Hospital v.
Hanson, 185 Misc. 937, 59 N.Y.S. 2d 91 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1945), which was not decided on free speech grounds.
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Relations Act at face value." 2 Despite the picketing-free speech cases,
the Wisconsin court maintained, picketing not in furtherance of a strike
authorized by a majority of a firm's employees can be enjoined. And
the Supreme Court of Colorado sustained a section of the Colorado
Labor Peace Act which restricted the picketing of an employer to those
of his employees who had been organized into a "collective bargaining
unit."' 3 An appeal to the United States Supreme Court was denied,
Justices Black and Murphy dissenting, "because of the inadequacy of
the record."" 4 A dictum in a Texas case is also worth mentioning in
this connection." 5 The Court of Civil Appeals thought that the legislature could not constitutionally prohibit peaceful picketing accompanying a strike approved by a majority of a company's workers; the implication remained that peaceful picketing in the absence of these conditions could be enjoined.
2) State court interpretationof "a close interdependence of economic
interest": The remaining cases in the first category reflect efforts of
the courts to apply new facts to the Wohl-Ritter pattern. One New
York Court held that a striking newspaper writer who picketed a bakery
which continued to advertise in the struck paper was guilty of disorderly
conduct." 6 Another enjoined a union in dispute with a gasoline corporation from picketing one of its firm's customers on the ground that
no unity of economic interest existed between union and customer."'
An Ohio court restrained a union on strike against one company from
carrying placards reading "This Plant is Doing Our Work" before a
company which accepted orders from the first. 118 The court found, that
although there was a clear economic connection between the two firms,
the volume of work sublet by the struck firm did not increase during
the labor dispute. An intermediate New York court, in Enterprise
112

Retail Clerks Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 242 Wis. 26, 6

N.W.2d 698 (1942).
113 Denver Milk Producers, Inc. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 116 Colo. 389, 183
P.2d 529 (1948).
114 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Denver Milk Producers, Inc., 334 U.S.
529 (1947).
115 Alamo Express v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 215 S.W. 2d 936 (Tex. Civ. App.

1948).
116 People v. Fleishman, 36 N.Y.S. 2d 559 (N.Y. City Ct. Sp. Sess. 1942).
117 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 185 Misc. 409, 57
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1945), aff'd, 270 App. Div. 129, 58 N.Y.S. 2d 495 (2d
accord, Florsheim Shoe Co. v. Retail Salesmen's Union, 288 N.Y. 188, 42
(1942) (decided in part on other grounds).
118 Ridge Mfg. Co. v. United Elec., Radio & Machine Workers Local, 77
(Ohio C.P. 1947).

N.Y.S. 2d 24
Dep't 1945) ;
N.E.2d 480
N.E. 2d 248
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Slowuta,"9°

Window Cleaning Co. v.
decided that pickets could be prevented from following the window washers employed by a window-washing
firm with whom the union was in dispute. A strong dissenting opinion
maintained that the economic relationship of the union and the window
washers was a close one, and pointed to the similarities between these
circumstances and "following a product." In still another case, resembling Bakery & Pastry Workers v. Wohl, a union was permitted to
picket a hotel reselling to the public for profit bread purchased by it
from an "unfair" bakery. 20 The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in a
case decided some months before CafeteriaEmployees Union v. Angelos,
arrived at essentially the Supreme Court's conclusion: the Fourteenth
Amendment prevents a blanket prohibition of all peaceful picketing
undertaken to force a self-employer to let union men do the work he
is doing with his own hands.' 2 ' At least one court completely ignored
the mandate of American Federation of Labor v. Swing and enjoined
picketing on the ground that no dispute existed between an employer
and his employees.' 22 In no case in which the proper scope of picketing was discussed (whether arising from state labor legislation or sets
of facts not clearly on all fours with one of the Supreme Court's decisions) did a court suggest that peaceful picketing, even during a
"bona fide" labor dispute, was constitutionally protected regardless of
purpose. On the contrary, it apparently was agreed that picketing
fo be constitutionally protected had to be conducted for lawful
objectives.
Picketing For Unlawful Objectives
By far the largest share of the picketing cases following the Wol and
Ritter decisions falls into the second category: the regulation of picketing by establishing objectives for which it could not be undertaken. The
Supreme Court, while it would brook no general prohibition against
picketing a party to a labor controversy, had refused to rule that picketing regardless of purpose was constitutionally protected. "It is significant," remarked the Supreme Court of Oregon, "that in those cases
where the Supreme Court identified picketing with free speech no unlawful purpose of the picketing was involved."" Declared the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, "Until we are more positively directed
119 273 App. Div. 662, 79 N.Y.S. 2d 91 (1st Dep't 1948).
120 People v. Briesblatt, 34 N.Y.S. 2d 184 (County, Ct. Sullivan County 1942).
121 Glover v. Minneapolis Bldg. Trades Council, 215 Minn. 533, 10 N.W. 2d 481 (1943).

122 Dallas General Drivers Union v. Oak Cliff Baking Co., 203 S.W. 2d 586 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1947).
123

Peters v. Cent. Labor Council, 179 Ore. 1, 10, 169 P. 2d 870, 874 (1946).
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to the contrary we prefer to think [that picketing may be prohibited
when] the defendants' method of speaking involves an otherwise un."I" Thus it relawful combination for an unjustified objective ..
mained possible for the states to accomplish indirectly what constitutionally they could not attempt directly. The lower court cases treating the objectives for which picketing might not be conducted may be
divided into two major groups: 1) cases in which the picketing was
held to cause, force, or result in the violation of a statute; and
2) those in which the picketing was held to cause, force, or result in
practices that judges more or less without the benefit of legislative
guidance deemed improper or undesirable.
1) Violation of a statute as an unlawful objective: In one series of cases,
picketing was enjoined as illegal because its objective was to bring
about violations of anti-trust and monopoly laws, or legislation regulatIn several instances, however, so
ing the conduct of common carriers.'
little evidence appears of union intention to violate the laws that court enjoinder of picketing for this reason is suspect as a mere sham for restricting picketing.'2 6 Other courts found that in similar situations such
legislation was inapplicable, 27 one going so far as to observe that if the
anti-trust laws did apply to picketing simply because third parties out
of deference to the picketers refused to cross the picket lines, the laws
28
would be unconstitutional
Where the violation of labor legislation was the claimed unlawful
Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 75, 76 N.E. 2d 12, 15 (1947).
125 Burlington Transp. Co. v. Hathaway, 234 Ia. 135, 12 N.W. 2d 167 (1943); Harper
v. Brennan, 311 Mich. 489, 18 N.W. 2d 905 (1945) ; Empire Storage & Ice Co. v. Giboney,
357 Mo. 671, 210 S.W.2d 55 (1948), aff'd, 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Rogers v. Poteet, 355
Mo. 986, 199 S.W. 2d 378 (1947) ; Hobbs v. Poteet, 357 Mo. 152, 207 S.W. 2d 501 (1947);
Mayer Brothers Poultry Farmers v. Meltzer, 274 App. Div. 169, 80 N.Y.S. 2d 874 (1st Dep't
1948) ; Ridge Mfg. Co. v. Elec. Workers Local, 77 N.E. 2d 248 (Ohio C.P. 1947) ; Dickson
v. North East Texas Motor Freight Lines, 210 S.W. 2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App., 1948), modified,
219 S.W.2d 795 (1949); Turner v. Zanes, 206 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (dictum).
See also Northwestern Pacific R.R. v. Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union, 31 Cal. 2d 441,
189 P. 2d 277 (1948) (original injuction modified on appeal).
126 Burlington Transp. Co. v. Hathaway, 234 Ia. 135, 12 N.W.2d 167 (1943);
Harper v. Brennan, 311 Mich. 489 18 N.W. 2d 905 (1945) ; Dickson v. North East Motor
Freight Lines, 210 S.W. 2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), modified, 148 Tex. 35, 219 S.W. 2d
795 (1949); Turner v. Zanes, 206 S.W. 2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), overruled on this
point in Ex parte Henry, 147 Tex. 315, 215 S.W.2d 588, 595 (1948).
127 Koss v. Continental Oil Co., 222 Ind. 224, 52 N.E.2d 614 (1944); Caldwell v.
Anderson, 357 Mo. 1199, 212 S.W.2d 784 (1948); Ex parte Henry, 147 Tex. 315, 215
S.W. 2d 588 (1948). See also Schivera v. Long Island Lighting Co., 296 N.Y. 26, 69 N.E. 2d
233 (1946) ; International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Missouri Pacific Freight Transp.
Co., 220 S.W. 2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
128 Ex parte Henry, 147 Tex. 315, 215 S.W. 2d 588 (1948).
124
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objective, judges generally held it unlawful to picket for the purpose
of forcing an employer to sign a contract which would interfere with
his employees' statutory right not to join a union. 9 Most likewise
proved ready to prevent minority or rival unions from picketing employers who were engaged in bargaining with unions certified by national or state labor relations boards or who were abiding by valid contracts with certified unions. 3 ' Picketing to frustrate majority rule as
fostered by law, they argued, is illegal. "There is no interference with
free speech," declared a New York Court, "when an injunction seeks only
to sustain the orderly processes of and mandates issued by and under the
constituted authority of the national government . .. ""'. The highest
court in Oregon, however, was not as ready to see the picketing-free
speech doctrine eroded away, and refused to sanction an injunction
against a union even though the contract it sought would have forced
an employer to violate the National Labor Relations Act.3 2 The pickets, maintained the court, had legal as well as illegal objectives. When
both are involved, picketing must be considered privileged. At the other
extreme, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a case previously cited, found
that picketing in connection with a strike which was unauthorized by
statute was enjoinable because undertaken for an unlawful purpose. 3
And a Texas court long distinguished for its hostility toward picketing
went even further. 34 A union picketed a crew engaged in moving a
129 Consumer Sand & Gravel Co. v. Kalamazoo Bldg. & Trades Council, 321 Mich. 361,
32 N.W. 2d 531 (1948); Silkworth v. Local 575, 309 Mich. 746, 16 N.W. 2d 145 (1944);
Wilbank v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, 360 Pa. 48, 60 A. 2d 21 (1948); Fred
Wolferman Inc. v. Root, 355 Mo. 986, 199 S.W. 2d 378 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 837
(1948). But cf. Standard Grocer Co. v. Local 406, 321 Mich: 276, 32 N.W. 2d 519 (1948).
In Gazzam v. Bldg. Serv. Union, 29 Wash. 2d 488, 188 P. 2d 97 (1947), aff'd, 339 U.S.
532 (1950), the Supreme Court overruled earlier decisions in which peaceful picketing had
been held constitutionally protected regardless of objective.
130 Dinny.& Robbins, Inc. v. Davis, 290 N.Y. 101, 48 N.E. 2d 280 (1943), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 811 (1943); Florsheim Shoe Co. v. Retail Salesmen's Union, 288 N.Y. 188, 42
N.E.2d 480 (1942); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Intl Brotherhood of Teamsters, 185 Misc. 409, 57
N.Y.S. 2d 24 (Sup. Ct., Queens County 1945), aff'd, 270 App. Div. 129, 58 N.Y.S. 2d 495
(2d Dep't 1945); Serval Slide Fasteners v. Molfetta, 188 Misc. 787, 70 N.Y.S. 2d 411
(Sup. Ct., Queens County 1947); Markham & Callow Co. v. Intl Woodworkers, 170 Ore.
517, 135 P. 2d 727 (1943); Swenson v. Seattle Central Labor Council, 27 Wash. 2d 193,
177 P. 2d 873 (1947). But cf. Sachs Quality Furniture, Inc. v. Hensley, 269 App. Div. 264,
55 N.Y.S. 2d 450 (1945) ; State v. Superior Court, 24 Wash. 2d 314, 164 P. 2d 662 (1945).
-131 Serval Slide Fasteners v. Molfetta, 188 Misc. 787, 791, 70 N.Y.S. 2d 411, 415 (Sup.
Ct., Queens County 1947).
132 Peters v. Central Labor Council, 179 Ore. 1, 169 P. 2d 870 (1946).
133 Retail Clerks' Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 242 Wis. 21, 6 N.W. 2d
698 (1942). See note 112 supra.
134 Construction & General Labor Union v. Stephenson, 221 S.W. 2d 375 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1949), modified, 148 Tex. 434, 225 S.W. 2d 958 (1950).
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building to accomplish any one of three things: to force the contractor
to replace some of his non-union workers with union members, or to encourage these non-union workers to form a union of their own, or to
enroll the non-union employees in the picketing union. All three objectives, said the court, were illegal under Texas' anti-secondary boycott law.
2) Judicially declared "unlawful practices" as unlawful objectives:
The absence of statutory provisions defining illegal labor objectives
proved no deterrent to a host of courts. Many judges considered themselves as fully qualified as the legislature to separate worthwhile labor
objectives from the anti-social and the undesirable and the Supreme
Court had not made the slightest move to inform them otherwise. More
than one court approved an injunction against picketing which tended
to induce a breach of contract. 35 Hughes v. Superior Court, 6 a decision
subsequently affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, held that
picketing for the purpose of persuading a company to hire Negro help
proportionate to its Negro trade was enjoinable. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stood firm against every challenge to its
half-century old position that the several varieties of union security arrangements were illegal picketing objectives. 3 7 Obiter dicta suggested
this state of mind was not peculiar to the Bay State. 13 8 Courts in Ohio,
Indiana, and California, however, continued in the absence of legislation to the contrary to regard the "closed shop" as a proper objective
of picketing. 39 The Supreme Court of California, nevertheless, in two
135 Gulf Oil Corporation v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 185 Misc. 409, 57 N.Y.S. 2d
24 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1945); Sterling & Welch Co. v. Duke, 67 N.E. 2d 24 (Ohio
C.P. 1946); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Downtown Employees' Ass'n., 204 S.W. 2d
685 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). Contra: Blossom Dairy Co. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters,
125 W. Va. 165, 23 S.E. 2d 645 (1942). Cf. Koss v. Continental Oil Co., 222 Ind. 224,
52 N.E. 2d 614 (1944) ; State v. Superior Court, 24 Wash. 2d 314, 164 P. 2d 662 (1945).
136 32 Cal. 2d 850, 198 P.2d 885 (1947), aff'd, 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
137 Davis Bros. Fisheries v. Pimental, 322 Mass. 499, 78 N.E. 2d 93 (1948); Colonial
Press v. Ellis, 321 Mass. 495, 74 N.E. 1 (1947); Fashioncraft v. Halpern, 313 Mass. 385,
48 N.E.2d 1 (1943).
138 Spickelmier v. Chambers, 113 Ind. App. 470, 47 N.E. 2d 189 (1943); Peters v.
Cent. Labor Council, 179 Ore. 1, 169 P. 2d 870 (1946). But see the subsequent decision
of the Indiana Supreme Court in Retail Clerks' Union v. Parker, 222 Ind. 209, 51 N.E. 2d
628 (1943).
139 Park & Tilford Import Corp. v. Int'l Brotherhood of 'teamsters, 27 Cal. 2d 599, 165
P. 2d 891 (1946) ; Retail Clerks' Union v, Parker, 222 Ind. 209, 51 N.E. 2d 628 (1943) ;
locomini's Restaurant Inc. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees' & Bartenders' Local, 85 N.E. 2d
534 (Ohio C.P. 1948); Lubbers v. Hurst, 78 N.E.2d 580 (Ohio C.P. 1946). See also
Hotel & Restaurant Employees' Intl Alliance v. Greenwood, 249 Ala. 265, 30 So. 2d 696
(1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948) (dictum).
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carefully-written and important decisions refused blanket approval of
the "closed shop" under all circumstances.
In Bautista v. Jones 40 the court sustained a permanent injunction restraining a union which would not admit independent milk peddlers to
membership from picketing to achieve a closed shop agreement with a
milk company. A group of workers, reasoned the court, ought not
to be permitted both a closed shop agreement and a closed union. James
v. Marinship Corporation41 turned on an essentially similar point.
The right to picket for a closed shop was denied a union because it restricted Negroes to its auxiliary, an unequal and ineffective branch of
the organization proper. A: California Appellate court applied this kind
of reasoning to a far from analogous set of facts-a suit seeking to
prevent the Journeymen Barbers, Hairdressers, and Cosmetologists'
Union from picketing to force master barbers to become non-voting
members of the union or forfeit their union shop display cards.'4 2 Such
picketing, insisted the court, was unlawful because its objective was to
force master barbers either to accept "sterile" membership or go out
of business.
Peaceful picketing to induce an employer to maintain union
standards was enjoined in another instance as an illegal attempt to
regulate the details of his business,' 43 and still another court suggested
through dictum that picketing a self-employer to make him join a union
would be unlawful.'" Several decisions betray the severe curtailment
of picketing possible by means of the unlawful objective doctrine. Picketing is permissible, declared an Ohio court, only if conducted for the
purpose of disseminating information' 45 In this case, it continued, in
an idiom smacking strangely of the pre-Thornhillera, the pickets' "purpose was to persuade or to intimidate or to coerce the non-striking
employees to desist from working and to join the strikers." 4 6 One Texas
court approved injunctive relief against picketing as a suitable means
140 25 Cal. 2d 746, 155 P. 2d 343 (1944).
141 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1945).

142 Riviello v. Journeyman Barbers Intl Union, 88 Cal. App. 2d 499, 199 P. 2d 400 (1948).
Cf. Rainwater v. Trimble, 207 Ga'. 306, 61 S.E. 2d 420 (1950).

143 Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 76 N.E. 2d 12 (1947). Contra: Pezold v. Amal.
Meat Cutters & Butchers Workmen of North America, 54 Cal. 2d 120, 128 P. 2d 611 (1942).
App. 129, 72 N.E. 2d 635 (1947). Contra:
144 Dinoffria v. Teamsters Union, 331 Ill.
Naprowa v. Chicago Flat Janitors' Union, 315 fll. App. 328, 43 N.E. 2d 198 (1942) ; Coons
v. journeymen Barbers' Union, 222 Minn. 100, 23 N.W. 2d 345 (1946).

145 Pipe Machinery Co. v. DeMore, 76 N.E. 2d 725 (Ohio App. 1947) ; appeal dismissed,
149 Ohio St. 582, 79 N.E. 2d 910 (1948). See also Construction & General Labor Union
v. Stephenson, 221 S.W. 2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949), modified, 225 S.W.958 (1950).

146 76 N.E. 2d at 726.
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of maintaining the status quo until the merits of the dispute could be
argued in the courtroom, 147 and another ordered picketing enjoined
because the union had given no prior notification of its intentions to
the employer and offered him no opportunity to negotiate. 14 8
The unlawful objective approach, as these decisions reveal, proved
far from satisfactory. "Unlawful objective" is a wonderfully plastic
concept. Its pliant qualities enabled the states to regulate picketing in
ways which the picketing-free speech doctrine on its face seemed to
forbid. Not a few courts displayed an acute awareness of the difficulty
inherent in such an elastic yardstick. Unions establish picket lines for
multiple motives. Almost invariably one objective is to better the economic condition of union members. Rarely did a court maintain that
the dissemination of information was not at least one objective of a particular picket line. 4 9 Another, almost always present, is to bring
economic pressure against an employer by inducing third parties through
persuasion or "coercion" to cease dealing with him. But even if these
objectives are classified as secondary or remote-and the logic of such
a step is decidedly questionable-the problem of mixed objectives does
not always magically vanish. Is a union, which would like to represent
a firm's workers, picketing to force it to violate the state's anti-trust
laws, to sign an illegal closed shop agreement, to become an organizer
for the union, or is the union picketing to win converts from among the
firm's employees, or by informing others of the facts of the dispute to
induce them not to deal with an "unfair" company? Some courts, recognizing this difficulty as an integral part of the unlawful objective rationale, floundered for possible solutions. The Supreme Court of Oregon,
as previously noted, on one occasion announced its intention of permitting picketing if one of the union's objectives was lawful. 5 ' Others,
apparently conscious of the several objectives present in the case under
consideration, tended to single out one objective as all-important.' 5 '
147

Dallas General Drivers Local v. Oak Cliff Baking Co., 203 S.W. 2d 586 (Tex. Civ.

App. 1947).
148 North East Texas Lines v. Dickson, 148 Tex. 35, 219 S.W. 2d 795 (1949). See also
Hotel & Restaurant Employees' Int'l Alliance v. Greenwood, 249 Ala. 265, 30 So. 2d 696

(1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948).
'49 But see Berger v. Sailors' Union of the Pacific, 29 Wash. 2d 810, 189 P. 2d 473 (1948).
150 Peters v. Cent. Labor Council, 179 Ore. 1, 169 P. 2d 870 (1946). See also Spickelmier
v. Chambers, 113 Ind. App. 470, 47 N.E. 2d 189 (1943).
151 Park & Tilford Import Corp. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 27 Cal. 2d 599,
165 P.2d 891 (1946); Standard Grocer Co. v. Local Union, 321 Mich. 276, 32 N.W.2d
519 (1948); Glover v. Bldg. Trades Council, 215 Minn. 533, 10 N.W.2d 481 (1943);
Rogers v. Poteet, 355 Mo. 986, 199 S.W. 2d 378 (1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 847 (1947),
rehearing denied, 332 U.S. 786 (1947); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Intl Brotherhood of Teamsters,
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An interesting solution offered was that the lawful and unlawful objectives be separated and picketing for the former permitted. If the union
proved itself incapable of pursuing the lawful objective without at the
same time achieving the unlawful, presumably all picketing would have
to be prohibited. 52
Basically the motives, purposes, and objectives of picketers did not
in themselves really interest the states. Their concern lay with the
effects and consequences of picketing. Many states were no longer
anxious to afford the picket line the protection they had been so willing
to grant it during the first years of the New Deal' 53 -and the unlawful
objectives doctrine provided a convenient way of circumventing the
rigorous limitations the picketing-free speech decisions seemed to place
upon efforts to deal with the far-reaching economic repercussions which
frequently followed in picketing's wake. But application of the unlawful objectives rationale was not by nature confined to those circumstances in which a pressing likelihood existed that the picketing would result in serious economic consequences. Quite the contrary, unless the
Supreme Court was willing to intervene there was every reason to believe that some states were ready to bar picketing almost entirely by one
or both of the following devices: 1) declaring it an illegal objective to
picket an employer in the absence of a strike authorized by a majority
or an even larger number of his employees; 2) declaring it an unlawful
objective to establish a picket line tending to deter third parties from
dealing with the picketed firm.
It seemed inevitable that sooner or later the Court would havd to
cope with the reigning confusion which resulted from the mass of
"unlawful objectives" cases. Three possibilities were open. First, it
was not yet too late for the Justices to stand firm against any further
185 Misc. 409, 57 N.Y.S. 2d 24 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1945), aff'd, 270 App. Div. 129,
58 N.Y.S. 2d 495 (2d Dep't 1945); Pipe Machinery Co. v. DeMore, 76 N.E. 2d 725 (Ohio
App. 1947), appeal dismissed, 149 Ohio St. 582, 79 N.E. 2d 910 (1948) ; Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Board v. Employees' Union, 361 Pa. 246, 64 A. 2d 834 (1949). Compare: State
v. Superior Court, 24 Wash. 2d 314, 164 P. 2d 662 (1945), with Swenson v. Seattle Central
Labor Council, 27 Wash. 2d 193, 177 P. 2d 873 (1947).
:52 This position is most fully presented in Society of New York Hospital v. Hanson,
185 Misc. 937, 59 N.Y.S. 2d 91 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1945). See also Whitehead v.
Miami Laundry Co., 160 Fla. 667, 36 So. 2d 382 (1948); Fred Wolferman Inc. v. Root,
356 Mo. 976, 204 S.W. 2d 733 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 837 (1948); Sterling & Welch
Co. v. Duke, 67 N.E. 2d 24 (Ohio C.P. 1946); Sachs Quality Furniture, Inc. v. Hensley,
269 App. Div. 264, 55 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1st Dep't 1945); Dickson v. North East Texas Motor
Freight Lines, 210 S.W. 2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), modified, 148 Tex. 35, 219 S.W. 2d
795 (1949); Turner v. Zanes, 206 S.W. 2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
153 A brief survey of the shift in state attitudes from 1937-1947 is presented in MILLIs
AND BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER AcT To TAFT-HARTLEY 316-344 (1950).
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inroads on peaceful picketing by holding picketing objectives to be
irrelevant. Second, the Court could in effect completely abandon its
picketing-free speech position by permitting the states to ban picketing
simply upon the finding that it was conducted for any illegal purpose.
Third, the Court could take a middle road by deciding that picketing
could be prohibited for certain objectives but not for others. On April
4, 1949, the Supreme Court emerged from its cloistered retreat and, in
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Company,'5 4 announced its unanimous decision to follow the middle course.
III
The Ice and Coal Drivers and Handlers Local Union No. 953, A. F. of
L. numbered among its members 160 of the two hundred retail ice peddlers in Kansas City. To better wages and working conditions, the
union undertook to sign up the non-union peddlers. As the organizational drive flagged, the union, in an effort to bolster it, asked every
wholesale ice distributor in the area to stop selling ice to non-union
peddlers. When Empire alone refused, the union threw a picket line
around its plant. Eighty-five percent of the truck drivers servicing
Empire carried union cards. All were prevailed upon to honor the picket
line, with the result that Empire immediately lost eighty-five percent
of its business. Empire sought an injunction restraining further picketing on the ground that any agreement not to sell ice to non-union peddlers would be in restraint of trade and that the union's efforts to compel
it to make such an agreement therefore violated the Missouri anti-trust
law. The union defended its actions contending that picketing was a
constitutionally protected form of speech. The trial court enjoined
the picketing. The Missouri Supreme Court, in affirming the injunction, ruled that the picketing had been undertaken for the unlawful
purpose of seeking to coerce an employer into joining a combination in
restraint of trade.155
In appealing to the United States Supreme Court, the union levelled
a double-barreled attack upon the state court's position. Picketing,
argued the appellants, is a method for publicizing the facts of a labor
dispute and cannot be enjoined "merely because a state chooses to regard the consequences of such picketing as restraint of trade." 56 In any
case, they continued, whatever the effects of the picketing upon trade,
114 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
1J'5 357 Mo. 671, 210 S.W. 2d 55 (1948).
166 Brief for Appellants, p. 27, Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490
(1949).
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they were entirely incidental. The purpose of the picket line was not
to violate the law, but to improve wages and working conditions by increasing union membership. To sustain the Missouri Court, they argued, would constitute a return to the old English law forbidding picketing to raise wages because of its incidental .effects on trade. 5 7 The
questions posed then were these: Is the constitutional right to publicize
the facts of a labor dispute by picketing lost because the picketing
tends to result in violation of state law? In general, do a union's objecfives have any effect upon its constitutional right to picket?* The Supreme
Court in a careful opinion written by Mr. Justice Black, gave a qualified
answer to each of these issues.
Mr. Justice Black heavily stressed both the importance of anti-trust
statutes and the effectiveness of'the picketing against Empire. Brushing
aside the union's contention that its primary purpose in picketing was
to improve wages and working conditions by winning new members,
he four times characterized the union's conduct as motivated by a "sole,
immediate objective--" to violate the state's anti-trust law. The picketing was not merely an attempt to publicize the facts of a labor dispute, but part of an "integrated" unlawful course of action:
.. it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press
to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part
initiated, evidenced, 58or carried out by means of language, either spoken,
written, or printed.'
Yet Mr. Justice Black took great pains to emphasize that Missouri's law
was not directed at a slight public inconvenience or annoyance. It was
passed for the important purpose of "affording all persons an equal opportunity to buy goods." The union's conduct, he argued, created a
...clear danger, imminent and immediate, that unless restrained, appellants would succeed in making that policy a dead letter insofar as purchases by nonunion men were concerned. Appellants' power with that of
their allies was irresistible. And it is clear that appellants were doing
more than exercising a right of free speech or press ....

They were exer-

cising their economic power together with that of their allies to compel
Empire to abide by union rather than by state regulation of trade ...
[T]his is not a case in which it can be assumed that injury from appellants' conduct would be limited to this single appellee. .

.

. Missouri,

acting within its power, has decided that such restraints of trade as petitioners sought are against the interests of the whole public.' 59
The Court, in other words, while sanctioning the enjoinder of peaceful
1" Appellants Brief in Opposition to Motion toDismiss or Affirm, pp. 20-21, Giboney
v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
158 336 U.S. at 502.
159 Id. at 503.
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picketing which was intended to and did in fact result in the violation
of a state law, seemed to add four caveats. Pickets would not lose an
otherwise constitutional immunity to publicize the facts of a labor dispute unless, first, there was evidence which proved their conduct to be
part of an "integrated" course of action whose sole immediate objective was to cause a violation of state law. Second, the law had to be directed against injury to the public. The language of the Thornhill case
still stood:160

It may be that effective exercise of the means of advancing public knowledge may persuade some of those reached to refrain from entering into
advantageous relations with the business establishment which is the scene
of the dispute. . . . [T]he group in power at any moment may not impose penal sanctions on peaceful and truthful discussion of matters of
public interest merely on a showing that others may be persuaded to take
action inconsistent with its interests. 161
The law, thirdly, cannot be aimed at "slight inconveniences or annoyances." Lastly, the picketing must constitute a clear and present danger
of violating a valid statute. For the first time since Thornhill v. Alabama the majority opinion in a picketing-free speech decision involved
the clear and present danger test. The Giboney case, because of these
caveats strongly underscored in its ratio decidendi, gave at least an
appearance of breathing new life into the picketing-free speech doctrine.
But, how accurately Mr. Justice Black's reasoning represented the consensus of the Court remained to be seen. There was little likelihood,
for example, that Justices Frankfurter and Jackson had suddenly been
won over to an unqualified endorsement of the clear and present danger
test in picketing cases. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Company, nonetheless, acted as a sharp reminder that the Supreme Court was not yet
ready to abandon the doctrine of picketing-free speech.
Not many months elapsed before the Supreme Court again spoke
on the subject of picketing-free speech. During the interim, enough
cases were decided to give some indication of the impact on the judiciary of the Giboney holding that a state can, if it observes the special
limitations outlined in Mr. Justice Black's opinion, prohibit picketing
undertaken to advance certain objectives. Ignoring Mr. Justice Black's
reasoning and adopting only the conclusion of the Giboney decision,
courts continued to enjoin picketing for unlawful objectives, as they
had in previous years. Several injunctions restrained unions from picket160 Id. at 503-4.
161 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940). The quotation itself is not reproduced in the opinion of the Court in the Giboney case.
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ing to force employers to act in violation of state
The Supreme
Court of Washington, in a case quickly certified for review by the United
States Supreme Court, judged it an unlawful objective to picket self-employed used car dealers for the purpose of making them adopt union shop
standards."ca In other cases, however, the effect of Mr. Justice Black's
reasoning in the Giboney decision is much in evidence. Three injunctions
were dissolved in the absence of proof that the union actually sought an
illegal closed shop, or conspired to restrain trade.164 An Ohio court, in
refusing an injunction against a picket line which caused union members
to walk off a construction job, held the secondary effects of the picketing incidental. 6 5 And one court even invoked the clear and present
danger test. 6 Unlawful objective cases, however, did not entirely eclipse
litigation concerning the areas from which all picketing could be constitutionally excluded. A building trades union was enjoined from advertising via the "sandwich man" its dispute with the City of Los Angeles
because, thought the California courts, there is no constitutional right
67

to picket a government.1

Whether a majority of the Supreme Court had actually accepted Mr.
Justice Black's reasoning in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.
beyond the narrow holding of the case that peaceful picketing for certain objectives can be constitutionally prohibited remained open to question. An unequivocal answer was not long in coming. Thirteen months
after the Giboney decision, the Court read three more picketing-free
speech decisions: Hughes v. Superior Court,6 ' International Brother162 Local Union v. Robertson, 44 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1950); Dayton Co. v. Floor Decorators' Union, 229 Minn. 155, 39 N.W. 2d 183 (1949) ; Phillips v. United Brotherhood of
Carpenters & Joiners, 362 Pa. 78, 66 A. 2d 227 (1949) ; Pacific Navigation & Trading Inc.
v. Nat. Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, 33 Wash. 2d 675, 207 P. 2d 221 (1949) ;
WERB v. Barbers' Union, 256 Wis. 77, 39 N.W. 2d 725 (1949). But cf. Baker Community
Hotel Co. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l League, 187 Ore. 58, 207
P. 2d 1129 (1949), where it was held that the state's anti-injunction law prevented enjoinder
of picketing to force an employer to make his employees join the union.
163 Hanke v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 33 Wash. 2d 646, 207 P. 2d 206 (1949),
aff'd, 339 U.S. 470 (1950). Accord: Cline v. Automobile Drivers & Demonstrators Local,
33 Wash. 2d 666, 207 P.2d 216 (1949), aff'd, 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
164 Local No. 802 v. Asimos, 216 Ark. 694, 227 S.W. 2d 154 (1950); Gruet Motor Car
Co. v. Briner, 229 S.W. 2d 259 (Mo. 1950); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Best Motor Lines, 229 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Civ. App. 912, 1950), rev'd, 237 S.W.2d 589 (1951).
165 W. E. Anderson Sons, Co. v. Local Union, 94 N.E. 2d 633, (Ohio App. 1950) ; rev'd,
156 Ohio St. 541, 104 N.E. 2d 22 (1952).
166 State ex rel. Culinary Workers Union v. Eighth Judicial District, 66 Nev. 166, 207
P. 2d 990 (1949), rehearing denied, 66 Nev. 202, 210 P. 2d 454 (1949).
167 Los Angeles v. Bldg. & Construction Trades Council, 94 Cal. App. 2d 36, 210 P.2d
305 (1949).
168 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
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hood of Teamsters v. Hanke,'m and Building Service Employees Union
v. Gazzam' 70 Of the three, the Gazzam case most resembled Giboney.
The Washington Supreme Court had affirmed an injunction restraining the union from picketing Gazzam, the operator of a hotel, to compel
him to sign a contract "coercing his employees' choice of bargaining
representative" in violation of state law."2 On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Minton, upheld the Washington court. In sustaining the injunction, Mr. Justice Minton took great
pains to demonstrate that the union's objective in picketing was to force
the employer to act against the state's policy as declared through its legislature. It was immaterial that the employer could not have been subjected
to any penalty had he coerced his workers into selecting the union as bargaining agent. The legislative declaration guaranteeing workers the
right freely to choose their bargaining representatives, the Justice maintained, is ndt a trivial and capricious policy, but "an important and
widely accepted one." Only picketing for the purpose of flouting this
policy was enjoined: "there, is no contention that picketing directed at
employees for organization purposes would be violative of that policy."' 7
tailored to prevent a specific violation of
The injunction in brief, "was
73
an important state law.'
Mr. Justice Black concurred, indicating only that he believed the
case to be "controlled by the principles announced in Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Company."' 74 While it would be presumptuous on the
basis of Mr. Justice Black's austere statement to state categorically
his precise objections to Mr. Justice Minton's reasoning, one difference
between the Giboney and Gazzam opinions is marked. The latter makes
no mention of the clear and present danger test. Yet the $500 awarded
Gazzam by the Washington courts for damages suffered while the
illegal patrolling took place, offered proof enough that the test could
have been convincingly applied had Mr. Justice Minton elected to do so.
Not even Mr. Justice Black, it is interesting to note, was willing to
attach significance to another difference between the two cases. In the
Giboney case the employer could not have acceded to the union's demand without subjecting itself to a possible penalty for violating the
state's anti-trust law. Gazzam, of course, ran no such risk because the
169
170
171
172
173

339 U.S. 470 (1950) ; rehearing denied, 339 U.S. 991 (1950).
339 U.S. 532 (1950); rehearing denied, 339 U.S. 991 (1950).
34 Wash. 2d 38, 207 P. 2d 699 (1949).
339 U.S. at 539.
Id. at 541.
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legislature's declaration of public policy did not impose any sanctions
against infringement. Mr. Justice Minton explicitly rejected the validity of this distinction; Mr. Justice Black could not have endorsed it
without dissenting."m
In Hughes v. Superior Court,'76 Mr. Justice Frankfurter for the fifth
time wrote the Court's opinion in a picketing-free speech case. A group
of persons in California had been convicted of contempt for violating a
state court injunction forbidding them to picket a grocery store for the
purpose of compelling it to hire Negro help in proportion to its Negro
trade. The picketers, alleging deprivation of their constitutional rights
to free speech, appealed to the Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
pointed to the long hostility of the California judiciary to color discrimination. He emphatically rejected the contention frequently raised
in free speech cases that judicial declarations of public policy are not entitled to fully as much respect as legislative enactment:
In charging its courts with evolving law instead of formulating policy by
statute, California has availed itself of the variety of law-making sources,
and has recognized that in our day as in Coke's "the law hath provided
several weapons of remedy." . . . California chose to strike at the dis-

crimination inherent in the quota system by means of the equitable
remedy of injunction to protect against unwilling submission to such a
choice from
system. It is not for this Court to deny to California that 77
among all "the various weapons in the armory of the law."'
Discriminatory employment practices, the Justice argued at length, are
matters of great importance and certainly within the state's power to
regulate. The appellants, he demonstrated by the following quotation from the state's court of last appeal, were restrained from picketing to compel discriminatory hiring and for this purpose alone:
The controlling points are that the injunction is limited to prohibiting
picketing for a specific unlawful purpose and that the evidence justified
the trial court in finding that such narrow prohibition was deliberately
violated... .17 [The State Court had added the following sentence which
Mr. Justice Frankfurter did not quote.] It may be assumed for the purposes of this decision, without deciding, that if such discrimination
79 exists, picketing to protest it would not be for an unlawful objective.
Justices Black, Minton, and Reed concurred. Mr. Justice Reed in
two sparse sentences explained,
17- For a discussion of situations in which this distinction might legitimately be considered see Fraenkel, Peaceful Picketing-ConstitutionallyProtected, 99 U. or PA. L. Rnv.
1 (1950).
176 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
177 Id. at 467.
:t78Id. at 462.
179 Hughes v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 850, 855, 198 P. 2d 885, 888 (1948).
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I read the opinion of the Supreme Court of California to hold that the
pickets sought from Lucky Stores, Inc. discrimination in favor of persons of the Negro race, a discrimination unlawful
under the California
80
law. Such picketing may be barred by a State.1
Justices Black and Minton simply said they were "of the opinion that
this case is controlled by the principles announced in Giboney v. Empire
8
Storage & Ice Co.'1 1
Since the eight Justices who took part all voted to sustain the injunction, it must have been either to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's reasoning
or to his language that Justices Black, Minton, and Reed took exception. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion actually met the same three of
the four principles laid down in the Giboney case as did Mr. Justice
Minton's opinion in the Gazzam case. The injunction undeniably was
directed at an evil both public and important. There can be no reason
to suppose that Justices Black, Minton, and Reed strenuously objected
to public policy being declared by judiciary rather than legislature;
otherwise they could not have concurred. No reliance, however, was
placed by the majority upon Mr. Justice Black's fourth criterion, the clear
and present danger test. This could explain Mr. Justice Black's concurrence, but in view of the Gazzam decision, not that of either Mr.
Justice Minton, or Mr. Justice Reed. One is, then, necessarily led to
suspect that all three took exception to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
language, and yet it is hard to find anything very specific to which
they might have objection. This very fact may be an important explanation for their failure to write concurring opinions.
Certain subtle differences between the Giboney and Gazzam opinions
on the one hand, and the Hughes case on the other, are nonetheless
detectable. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, for example, suggested that the
language of the Thornhill, Swing, Wohl, and Angelos cases might have
been "general or loose", and inveighed against the fallacy of equating
picketing and other forms of speech-perhaps above and beyond the
demands of the particular case. The Justice referred, though only in
passing, to the "reasonable basis" rationale he espoused in his Ritter
opinion-since free speech is only one of many important interests of
a society, the constitutionality of restrictions upon speech can best
be determined by carefully balancing the various interests involved.
Finally, Mr. Justice Frankfurter lashed out against the use of generalizations and efforts to establish a set of principles upon which to decide
future picketing cases:
180 Id. at 469.

181 Id. at 469.
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[T]he Constitution does not forbid "cautious advance, step by step, and
the distrust for generalities." . . . Generalizations are treacherous in the
application of large constitutional concepts.' 8 2
The Hughes opinion, in short, did not, as did the Gazzam case, and to a
much greater extent the Giboney decision, convey the impression that the
facts under consideration were rare exceptions to an extremely important
rule. The refusal of Justices Reed, Minton, and especially Black to endorse the majority opinion is perhaps best explained by their objection
to the casual substitution of the "reasonable basis" test for the painstakingly drafted Giboney formula.
The third case, International Brotherhood, of Teamsters v. Hanke,
was" by all odds the most important."
A union picketed the Hankes,
self-employed used car dealers in Seattle, to induce them to keep union
hours. In a companion case, Cline, another self-employed used car
dealer, was picketed to compel him to observe union hours and also
to induce him to hire a union salesman. The Washington Supreme
Court, affirming a permanent injunction against the picketing issued by
the trial court, declared that under the circumstances these objectives
were illegal. 8 All but ten of the 115 used car dealers in Seattle were,
like Cline and Hankes, self-employers without employees. Emphasizing
this fact, the Washington Court argued,
...the conclusion seems irresistible that the union's interest in the welfare of a mere handful of members (of whose working conditions no complaint at all is made) is far outweighed by the interests of individual
proprietors and the people of the community as a whole, to the end that
little businessmen and property owners shall be free from dictation as to
business policy by an outside group having but a relatively small and
indirect interest in such a policy. 85
The United States Supreme Court affirmed in a five -to three decision
written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter.
A state, in determining the permissibility of restrictions on picketing
in a particular case may weigh such community interests as free communications, effective unions, and the welfare of small businessmen.
Assessing such important interests as these is always a difficult task, the
Justice argued, and many may think the conclusions of Washington's
court unwise. Yet, he continued,
...

when one considers that issues not unlike those that are here have been

182 Id. at 469.
183 Id. at 470.
184 Hanke v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 33 Wash. 2d 646, 207 P. 2d 206 (1949);
Cline v. Automobile Drivers & Demonstrators Local, 33 Wash. 2d 666, 207 P. 2d 216 (1949).
185 33 Wash. 2d 646, 659-60, 207 P. 2d 206, 213 (1949).
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similarly viewed by other States and by the Congress of the United States,
we cannot conclude that Washington, in holding the picketing in these
cases to be for an unlawful object, has struck a balance so inconsistent
with rooted traditions of a free people that it must be found an unconstitutional choice. Mindful as we are that a phase of picketing is communi186
cation, we cannot find that Washington has offended the Constitution.
Reasoning along these lines carried the Court off on an entirely new
tack. The Court, in the Giboney, Gazzam, and Hughes cases, had sustained the enjoinder of picketing whose purpose was to induce employers
to act in a way not consonant with public policy, whether legislatively
or judicially formulated. In the Swing, Wohl, Ritter, and Angelos cases,
the majority blocked out the general scope of permissible picketing
by marking off areas within which blanket prohibitions could or could
not be placed upon picketing. But in Hanke's case, the Washington
court had done neither. It did not enjoin the picketing because its
objective was to induce action in violation of public policy, nor because
state policy excluded self-employers from the area of allowable economic
conflict. Rather, picketing was prevented because its consequences in
the particular case were considered to contravene the community's
best interests. This rationale might be termed the "community interest"
rule.
The Washington injunctions, Mr. Justice Frankfurter warned, banned
picketing under very special circumstances; the Court's action in sustaining these restrictions must not be interpreted as sanctioning limitations
on picketing one mote broader. Endorsing the rationale of the Washington court, nevertheless, was virtually tantamount to giving courts the
authority to enjoin "undesirable" picketing. Unless the Supreme Court
established more specific standards to guide lower court evaluations of
community interests than the vague "reasonable basis" test, courts
could under the Hanke rule enjoin picketing at will without fear of
violating the Constitution. All they needed to do was find that picketing
in particular cases was contrary to the public interests.
Mr. Justice Minton, joined by Mr. Justice Reed, contributed a provocative dissent. The picketing-free speech cases, argued the Justice,
established a pattern from which InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters
v. Hanke departed. According to his thesis, only "abusive" picketing
(a new term in the extensive picketing-free speech glossary) had ever
been enjoined. No "abuses" were present in the Thornhill, Swing, and
Wohl cases. The picketing in Meadowmoor, on the other hand, was
enmeshed in violence, and in Giboney and Gazzam, pickets sought to
186 339 U.S. at 478-9.
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force employers to violate state law and public policy. The Hanke
and Cline injunctions ought to have been dissolved because they constituted a permanent enjoinder of peaceful picketing without distinguishing "between what is legitimate picketing and what is abusive.... [T]he
decrees here are not directed at any abuse of picketing but at all picket87

ing."1

Mr. Justice Minton's analysis of the Court's picketing decisions
is grossly oversimplified and patently inaccurate, but it cannot be lightly
dismissed. Indeed, one cannot but suspect he was fully conscious of its
logical flaws. His approach, though it would have forced the Court
to retract a good many embarrassing paragraphs and frequently cited
passages, and perhaps overrule the Ritter case as well, offered the
states a workable and decidedly attractive method for dealing with
picketing-free speech problems. States, even if the "abusive picketing"
test were adopted, could regulate the anti-social potentialities of picketing
through labor relations acts or common law development. Picketing
which sought to induce violation of public law and policy could be
enjoined as abusive under the Giboney-Gazzam-Hughes principles. The
Supreme Court, consequently, would be able to abandon largely to
states the task of defining the allowable area of economic conflict. Moreover, the Supreme Court, if it could once and for all lay down some
such general formula would go far in creating a semblance of the clarity
and stability so foreign to the law of picketing. Lastly, the master
in equity would not be able, as is now possible under the Hanke
rationale, to prohibit picketing simply because in his opinion it
contravenes the public interest. Had Mr. Justice Minton's "abusive
picketing" approach been accepted, the Court's only major function
in picketing-free speech cases would have been to decide whether the
public policy in opposition to which picketing could not be directed, was
important enough to justify the restriction of speech.
The Court's rejection in Hanke's case of the "abusive picketing" thesis
in favor of a "community interest" rule offered the. states a third method
of restricting peaceful picketing. Courts, whose equitable powers had
not been clipped, it has already been observed, could use the "community
interest" rule to enjoin any instance of "undesirable" picketing. The
Michigan courts proceeded to do just this. 8 Arkansas' Supreme Court, in
Boyd v. Dodge,189 moved in a direction the United States Supreme Court
187 339 U. S. at 484.
188 Midwest Properties Co. v. Hairdressers Union, 330 Mich. 478, 47 N.W. 2d 703 (1951);
Cohen v. Joint Board Aral. Clothing Workers, 327 Mich. 606, 42 N.W.2d 830 (1950);
Woods v. Detroit Chefs Union, 327 Mich. 612, 42 N.W. 2d 833 (1950).
189 217 Ark. 919, 234 S.W.2d 204 (1950).
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can conceivably take if it decides to establish some limitations on the
application of the "community interest" rationale. An injunction against
picketing was granted by a trial court because it believed the disruption
of telephone service against the public interest. The state's highest
court thought the justification for the injunction too insubstantial and
dissolved it.
The two other methods for restricting picketing, so widely used in
the years following Wohl and Ritter, lost none of their popularity.
First, courts continued to consider the scope of constitutionally protected
picketing and the areas in which blanket prohibitions could be instituted.190 One case, Edwards v. Commonwealth,.9 deserves special mention. A Virginia statute restricted the picketing of a business or
industry to its bona fide employees. The state's Supreme Court of Appeals, in invalidating the law, said:
It could be applied to make it a crime for any person not employed by
a business or industry to publish, by word or sign, his opinion as to the
morality, the decency or the danger of what is being done by or said within
any business or industry, e.g., to picket or participate in picketing the
showing of a moving
picture considered by the picketer to be corruptive
19 2
of good morals.

Second, the bulk of picketing-free speech litigation, as previously,
consisted of unlawful objective cases. Courts repeatedly enjoined pickets
from pressuring employers to violate state law' and less frequently
194
from participating in unlawful conspiracies in restraint of trade.
Injunctions were denied in some cases on the ground that certain consequences of the picketing were not actual objectives but incidental
to its primary purpose. 9 5 Dicta in others in which picketing was
190 Holt v. Heine, 223 P. 2d 881 (Cal. App. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 893 (1950);
Outdoor Sports Corp. v. A. F. of L., 6 N.J. 217, 78 A. 2d 69 (1951); Grossman v. MacDonough, 28 L.R.R.M. 2240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County 1951); Tenzer v. Eisen, 27
L.R.R.M. 2482 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County 1951); National Shoes, Inc. v. Lawson,
27 L.R.R.M. 2247 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1951); Edwards v. Commonwealth, 191
Va. 272, 60 S.E.2d 916 (1950).
'191 191 Va. 272, 60 S.E.2d 916 (1950).
192 60 S.E. 2d at 923.
193 Self v. Taylor, 217 Ark. 953, 235 S.W. 2d 45 (1950); Kincaid-Webber Motor Co. v.
Quinn, 241 S.W. 2d 886 (Mo. 1951) ; La Manna v. O'Grady, 278 App. Div. 77, 103 N.Y.S. 2d
476 (1st Dep't 1951) ; Harber & Fink, Inc. v. Jones, 277 App. Div. 176, 98 N.Y.S. 2d 393
(1st Dep't 1950) ; Tamagno v. Waiters Union, 27 L.R.R.M. 2593 (Pa. C.P. 1951); Sheet
Metal Workers Local v. Walker, 236 S.W. 2d 683 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
194 Best Motor Lines v. Intl Brotherhood of Teamsters, 237 S.W. 2d 589 (Tex. 1951).
See Missouri Cafeteria v. McVey, 362 Mo. 583, 242 S.W. 2d 549 (1951).
195 Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Brick Workers, 218 Ark. 707, 238 S.W. 2d 945 (1951);
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actually enjoined upheld the same point of view."'
IV
The most recent picketing cases decided by the Supreme Court
arose under the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947.198

97

After

twelve years of strenuous efforts, the opposition to the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935 gathered enough momentum to alter that law
drastically.'9 9 Among the Act's most significant emendations was a
Section 8 (b) (4) (A), (B), (C), and (D)I ° which, while no "model
of draftsmanship",2 "1 was clearly intended to outlaw "secondary" boycotts. 2 ° 2 In Senator Taft's words:

All this provision of the bill does is to reverse the effect of the law as to
secondary boycotts. It has been set forth that there are good secondary
boycotts and bad secondary boycotts. Our committee heard evidence for
weeks and never succeeded in having anyone tell us any difference between
different kinds of secondary boycotts. So we have so broadened the provision dealing
with secondary boycotts as to make them an unfair labor
20 3
practice.

Picketing as the most important instrument for effectuating "secondary"
boycotts was thereby severely curtailed. Actually rather than limit
Boyd v. Deena Artware, 239 S.W. 2d 86 (Ky. 1951) (dictum); Palace Knitwear Inc. v.
Knitgoods Workers, 28 L.R.R.M. 2006 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1951); Dummermuth
v. Hykes, 95 N.E. 2d 32 (Ohio C.P. 1950); Alamo Motor Lines v. Intl Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 229 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
190 La Manna v. O'Grady, 278 App. Div. 77, 103 N.Y.S. 2d 476 (1st Dep't 1951);
Harber & Fink, Inc. v. Jones, 277 App. Div. 176, 98 N.Y.S. 2d 393 (1st Dep't 1950);
Kincaid-Webber Motor Co. v. Quinn, 241 S.W. 2d 886 (Mo. 1951).
197 NLRB v. Int'l Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. &
Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); International Brotherhood of Elec.
Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951) ; Local 74, Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners
v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 707 (1951).
198 61 STAT. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. 1952).
199 MiMLs AND BROWN, FROa THE WAGNER ACT To TAFr-HARTLEY 271-392 (1950).
200 61 STAT. 141-2; 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (4) (A), (B), (C), and (D) (Supp. 1952).
291 Printing Specialties & Paper Converters Union v. La Baron, 171 F. 2d 331, 335 (9th
Cir. 1948).
202 Few terms in the history of the law have caused so much confusion and been used
in so many different senses as "secondary boycott." See Editorial Note, 15 GEO. WASH1. L.
REv. 327 (1947); Barnard and Graham, Labor and the Secondary Boycott, 15 WASH. L.
REa. 137 (1940). The latter adds:
It is in the treatment of those cases involving labor's most utilized weapon-the
picket-that the analytical treatment of the "secondary boycott" has sunk to its
lowest ebb.
Id. at 149. For a comprehensive discussion of secondary boycott cases arising under the
Act before June of 1950, see Dennis, The Boycott Under the Taft-Hartley Act, TaMar
AiNiuA Coy.aaTEcE ON LABOR 367-460 (1950).
203 93 CONG. REC. 4198 (1947).
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the scope of picketing as such, Congress made certain picketing objectives unfair labor practices.
According to Section 8 (b) (4) picketing which induced employees
of an employer in the course of their jobs to engage in a concerted refusal
to perform any services was an unfair labor practice if one of the
following was among its objectives:
1) forcing any employer or self-employer to join a union or employer's
organization;
2) forcing any person to cease doing business with any other person;
3) forcing another employer to deal with a noncertified union; 4) forcing an employer to deal with one union when another is
certified;
5) forcing an employer to give work to a particular group rather
than to some other group unless the employer was violating a Board
order.
Virtually all picketing involves at least one of these objectives, and,
consequently, would have been rendered unlawful had not Congress
appended to Section 8 (b) (4) a proviso underscoring its intention not
to interfere with primary picketing undertaken by a majority union
in connection with an authorized strike simply because it had the
incidental effect of causing a "secondary" boycott. A subsequent Section
of the Act, 8 (c), furthermore declared:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or
20 4
force or promise of benefit.

Two basic questions were immediately asked: 1) Does 8 (c) in any
way qualify the sweeping restrictions of Section 8 (b) (4)? 2) If not,
does Section 8 (b) (4) infringe in any way upon freedom of speech?
Some months before Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co. had been
decided, cases requiring a categorical answer to these questions reached
two United States Courts of Appeals almost simultaneously.20 5 Both
decisions denied that either 8 (c) or the Constitution limited Section
8 (b) (4) (A). 2° Shortly thereafter, but still prior to the Giboney
decision, the National Labor Relations Board, in United Brotherhood
29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (Supp. 1952).
205 Printing Specialties & Paper Converters Union v. Le Baron, 171 F. 2d 331 (9th Cir.
1948) ; United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Sperry, 170 F. 2d 863 (10th Cir. 1948).
206 While the specific questions in these cases concern Section 8 (b) (4) (a), the same
principles are involved in Sections 8 (b) (4) (B), (C), and (D).
204 61 STAT. 142,
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of Carpenters (Wadsworth Building, Inc.),27 discussed the same questions at length. The Board members were badly divided. The majority
opinion first pointed out that the constitutionality of the Act was not
for the Board to decide. Interpreting the meaning of the Act, on the
other hand, assuredly was; and "the task of choosing between the broad
language of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and the equally broad language of
Section 8 (c) is not a simple or enviable one."2 08 They concluded
after an examination of the Act's legislative history that 8 (c) does
not modify Section 8 (b) (4) (A). Chairman Herzog entertained such
serious doubts about the constitutionality of the restrictions on picketing that he felt constrained to express his misgivings in a concurring
opinion. Members Houston and Murdock dissented. Section 8 (c),
they maintained, does limit Section 8 (b) (4) (A). They were convinced that Congress included 8 (c) because it was quite aware Section
8 (b) (4) (A), if unqualified, would be judged unconstitutional. The
legislative history, they argued, supported this contention.
With the Supreme Court's Giboney decision virtually all chance that
Taft-Hartley's restrictions on peaceful picketing would be invalidated
evanesced. Giboney "seems to make it plain" said the United States
Court of Appeals, for the Second Circuit, that Section 8 (b) (4) (A)
is constitutional.20 9 No subsequent court expressed a contrary opinion.
The Supreme Court of the United States on June 4, 1951 announced
its decision in four cases involving Section 8 (b) (4).21 Mr. Justice
Burton, spoke for the Court in each instance. In one case, International
Brotherhood of ElectricalWorkers v. National Labor Relations Board, 1
the free speech issue was squarely faced. Mr. Justice Burton first endorsed the Board's ruling that Section 8 (c) does not limit Section 8
(b) (4).
To exempt peaceful picketing from the reach of § 8(b)(4) would be
to open the door to the customary nieans of enlisting the support of employees to bring economic pressure to bear on their employer. .

.

. The

legislative history does not sustain a congressional purpose to outlaw
207 81
208

N.L.R.B. 802 (1949).

Id. at 814.

209 NLRB v. Wine, Liquor, & Distillery Workers Union, 178 F. 2d 584 (2d Cir. 1949).
See also NLRB v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 184 F. 2d 60 (10th Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 947 (1951); NLRB v. Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters,
181 F. 2d 126 (6th Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 707 (1951) ; Douds v. Confectionery & Tobacco
jobbers Employees, 85 F. Supp. 191 (D.C. S.D.N.Y. 1949); Le Baron v. Los Angeles
Building & Construction Trades Council, 84 F. Supp. 629 (D.C. S.D. Cal. 1949); Le Baron
v. Printing Specialties & Paper Converters Union, 75 F. Supp. 678 (D.C. S.D. Cal. 1948).
210 For citations see note 197 supra.
211 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
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47

secondary boycotts
under § 8(b) (4) and yet in effect to sanction them
2 12
under § 8(c).
He then disposed of appellants' constitutional arguments in summary
fashion.
The prohibition of inducement or encouragement of secondary pressure
by § 8(b) (4) (A) carries no unconstitutional abridgement of free speech.
The inducement or encouragement in the instant case took the form
of picketing followed by a telephone call emphasizing its purpose. The
constitutionality of § 8(b) (4) (A) is here questioned only as to its possible relation to the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. This provision has been sustained by several Courts of Appeals.
The substantive evil condemned by Congress in § 8(b) (4) is the secondary boycott and we recently have recognized the constitutional right
of states to proscribe picketing in furtherance of comparably 2 unlawful
13
objectives. There is no reason why Congress may not do likewise
Mr. Justice Burton, in Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters &
2 4
Joiners of America v. National Labor Relations Board
brushed off
the free speech question even more cavalierly:
We have considered the remaining questions raised by petitioners, based
on constitutional or other grounds, and have resolved them in favor
of sustaining the Board and the court below.215
Finally, the Justice strongly emphasized that picketing may be characterized as unlawful if only one of its objectives has been proscribed.

V
The law of picketing-free speech as it now stands may be stated as
follows:
1) No blanket prohibitions on the scope of picketing within certain
areas are permissible. A state may not outlaw all stranger picketing,
picketing a self-employer, or picketing which follows "unfair" products.
States may, however, confine picketing to areas within which a close
economic relationship exists between picketers and picketed. Any
blanket interdiction of picketing not falling within the areas already
delineated must be justified by showing such a restriction to be "reasonable."
2) Picketing may be banned if undertaken in support of unlawful
objectives. Objectives to be validly made unlawful must be aimed at
substantive evils. Whether evils are substantive enough to warrant
212

Id. at 703-4.

213 Id. at 705.
214 341 U.S. 707 (1951).

216 Id. at 715.
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limitations on picketing is presumably to be determined by means of
the "reasonable basis" test.
3) Picketing may be enjoined if its conduct is inconsonant with the
best interests of the community. Once again the standard for evaluating
the validity of restrictions upon picketing seems to be the "reasonable
basis" test.
The Court, while it has to a considerable extent spelled out the
permissible scope of blanket restrictions on picketing, has no more
than faintly sketched the limitations the Constitution places on use of
the "unlawful objective" and "community interest" doctrines. States,
if some concrete bounds are not placed upon application of the "unlawful objective" doctrine, can largely circumvent the constitutional
limitations announced in the Thornhill, Swing, Wohl, and Angelos
cases, and outlaw most picketing by imposing sweeping restrictions upon
the legality of its objectives. Extensive use of the "community interest"
rationale, unless stringently regulated, could turn the law of picketing
into a highly personalized equation devoid of standards in the least
degree objective and uniform. If the Court is to prevent picketing-free
speech from passing into the graveyard of judicial dogma, fossilized
and discarded, it is within these latter areas that future decisions are
to be expected.
VI
Several observations about picketing-free speech are perhaps in order
at this point.
1) Each inroad upon picketing-free speech in recent years has provoked in labor circles protests that the "common law" was being
resuscitated. If these objections were simply a way of saying that the
states have been permitted to restrict picketing in a fashion Thornhill v.
Alabama seemed to forbid, then they are indeed justified. Momentous
developments in the law have certainly taken place since Thornhill's
case was decided in the spring of 1940: the clear and present danger test
has bowed out in favor of the "reasonable basis" test; judicial restrictions
upo'n picketing have been blessed with the full respect and validity
afforded legislative regulations; the "unlawful objective" and "community interest" doctrines have been established. All of these developments have worked to the discomfiture of labor. Nevertheless, if the
argument that the "common law" has been resurrected implies picketingfree speech has been abandoned and tort doctrines revivified, they are
wide of the mark. Tort doctrine regarded picketing as illegal unless
justified; free speech doctrine considers restraints upon picketing un-
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constitutional unless justified. The burden of proof still rests, as it has
since Thornzill's case, on the shoulders of those who seek to limit
picketing.
2) There is considerable merit, on the other hand, to the contention
that the contents of permissible picketing may, if present trends continue, be only slightly distinguishable from the contents of picketing under
the tort doctrine in the years after 1921. Whether picketing will in
the future be confined to nominal patrolling in support of primary strikes
will depend upon two factors: the political interests and pressures which
formulate state and national labor policy; and the Supreme Court's
decision whether to intervene through additional picketing-free speech
decisions. Ultimately the consideration of greatest importance will
be the former. Actually the primary difficulty with the law of picketing
in the years before the New Deal was neither the tort basis of the law,
nor the more or less unfriendly attitude of many judges. Rather it
centered in the weakness of organized labor. Had labor in the early
decades of the century been as powerfully organized as it is today
nominal picketing would have proved fully as effective a weapon as it
does now. And picketing-free speech played little part in building
labor's strength.
3) Perhaps the strangest facet of the entire picketing story is that when
labor was weak, and nominal picketing essentially a form of persuasion
carrying a relatively small economic impact, the judiciary shrank from
it in deathly fear. It was at the very time when the peaceful picket
line began to take on menacing proportions that the Supreme Court
characterized it as a form of speech entitled to constitutional protection.
But the Court speedily came to recognize that in picketing-free speech
it had a raging lion by the tail. With each successive picketing-free
speech decision, the Court displayed an increasing awareness of
economic facts. The resemblances between picketing and conventional
speech seemed ever hazier. It is no small tribute to Justice Frankfurter, one may add, that, after devoting many years in an uphill
struggle for "labor's rights", he was among the first to recognize the
"new picketing" for what it was. It takes uncommon fortitude, even
for men shielded by the majesty of the Supreme Court's secluded
chambers, to brave charges of betrayal for the sake of "justice".
4) Finally, one cannot help in wading through the maze of picketingfree speech cases but be amused, and sometimes disturbed, by the
continual invocation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and what
they "obviously" do or do not command in regard to picketing-free

50
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speech. It is refreshing from time to time to recall Mr. Justice Holmes'
dissent in Truax v. Corrigan216 "There is nothing that I more deprecate
than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words....
216 257 U.S. 312 (1921).

217 Id. at 344.

